The Chickamauga Campaign (review)

The campaign and battle of Chickamauga are unique in several respects. First, it was the largest and bloodiest affair in the western theater. Second, it was the only significant victory for the leadership-challenged Army of Tennessee. Third, compared to other large-scale battles it was a welter of confusing and bizarre military decisions, troop movements, miscommunication, and, of course, years of second-guessing among contemporaries and historians alike wrapped in layers of controversy.

This collection of essays features leaders who shaped the outcome of the campaign such as Braxton Bragg, William S. Rosecrans, Thomas L. Crittenden, Alexander M. McCook, D. H. Hill, Patrick Cleburne, James S. Negley, and James Longstreet. The content of the essays consists mostly of traditional military history, with a lot of detailed critique of troop movements, tactics, discussion of terrain, and other important nuances only the most dedicated military historians pay attention to when dissecting battles, leaders, and outcomes of large-scale Civil War campaigns.

Ethan Rafuse’s essay on Thomas L. Crittenden and Alexander M. McCook focuses on these two generals’ roles in the reshuffling of several divisions that eventually allowed the Confederate army to punch a hole in the Federal line and roll up the Union right flank. As Rafuse points out, a military court of inquiry exonerated both Crittenden and McCook. Steven E. Woodworth analyzes the lost opportunity for the Army of Tennessee on September 10 and 11 at McLemore’s Cove. Before the battle, Braxton Bragg and the Army of Tennessee missed a golden opportunity “to cripple Rosecrans’s army, leaving its three sundered corps unable to support each other against the centrally positioned Confederate force” (50). Woodworth describes the failure as a combination of underlying political rancor within the leadership of the Army of Tennessee, miscommunication, and the ability of federal command to recognize and react to the Confederate threat.

Alexander Mendoza examines the role of D. H. Hill and the rather toxic political squabbling that plagued the leadership of the Army of Tennessee. Mendoza argues that Braxton Bragg’s recalcitrant corps commanders unduly influenced Hill’s opinion of the oft-criticized general. The author further points out that Hill “did not deserve to be made the scapegoat of the Confederacy’s lost opportunities at Chickamauga” (80). Lee White explores the role of A. P. Stewart on September 20 in the Army of Tennessee’s breaking the center of the Federal line, yet points out the inability of the Confederates to follow up on their success. Similarly, John R. Lundberg points out that Patrick Cleburne’s night assault on September 19 had hampered the ability of the Confederate army to follow up more fully on their “pyrrhic” victory at Chickamauga.

William G. Robertson reexamines the role of Gen. James Longstreet. He argues that Longstreet arrived too late to the field exhausted from travel and lack of sleep to have any substantive effect on the strategy or the outcome of the battle. David Powell’s essay posits that Union general James S. Negley’s mistake in abandoning the field at Horseshoe Ridge rests on “the fact that he abandoned the field with so many troops and cannon” and it “left an indelible stain on his career, which until then had been admirable” (160).

The last essay features Timothy B. Smith tracing the origins of the National Park movement through two Union army veterans, Henry Van Ness Boynton and Ferdinand Van Derveer. Although this last essay does not really fit with the rest of the volume, it is an informative analysis into the origins of the modern military national park system, for which Chickamauga played a significant role.

This collection of essays provides a much-needed fresh examination of the events and important figures involved in the Chickamauga campaign. However, because of its heavy emphasis on detailed description of troop movements (often broken up into minutes and hours) and the obligatory analysis of key blunders, lost opportunities, and what-if scenarios, more maps are sorely needed to afford the...