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THE CAUSATION OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF PETER JOHN OLIVI, O. F. M. According to his Commentary on the Second Book of the Sentences and the Quaestiones de Deo Cognoscendo I INTRODUCTION Father Olivi would describe the act of cognition as the actual, immediate expression of an object, accompanied by a certain formal and actual assimilation by the knowing subject. This assimilation could take place by the inspection of a remembeied species, by "Divine Illumination ," or by a natural colligantia. Cognition which results from the consideration of a. remembered species is essentially the same as cognition of sensible things. The only difference between the two types of knowledge is that a remembered species rather than a sensible object terminates the active power.1 II DIVINE ILLUMINATION The last representatives of the First Franciscan School,2 though avid supporters of the Illumination theory, were becoming more aware of its inherent difficulties. Was the Illumination a supernatural grace or a natural gift? Did it replace or elevate man's natural ability to know? Peter Olivi adhered to this doctrine of Illumination, but he was enough of an iconoclast to admit that many objections against it were unanswerable.3 In the second question On Knowing God, he defends 1 How this takes place will be treated more fully under "Natural Cognition " (section 3). Cf. P. J. Olivi, O. F. M., Quaestiones in Hum Librum Sententiarum, B. Jansen, S. J., (ed.), (Quaracchi: Colleg. S. Bonaventurae, 1922—1926), III, p. 115; II, p. 281, 485, 507. (Henceforth all citations referring to Olivi's Commentary will be given by volume and page from this Quaracchi edition.) 2 Matthew of Aquasparta, Bartholomew of Bologna, Roger Marston, etc., cf. E. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, p. 344. 3 De Deo Cognoscendo: III, 512; II, 457 Xl Franciscan Studie·, 1956313 314J- MARSCHALL St. Augustine and his theory from attacks by the "Magni."4 But he concludes his rejoinder by offering five caveats to those professing the doctrine of Divine Illumination: i. Augustine holds that species in the memory are the prime and immediate object of the intellect. If these are related to the eternal reasons, then we fall into the error of ontologism. Hence the "reasons" cannot be considered as "forms" of or in our minds.5 2. If these "reasons" were immediately represented to us before inspection or cognition (just as the species in the memory), then it would follow that they are immediately seen by us "eo modo quo error superpositus asserebat."* 3. The "reasons" must not be thought of as natural and total principles or as instrumental and secondary principles of cognition. Otherwise free will would be endangered.7 4. We must beware not to destroy the possibility of naturally acquired truth.8 5. A Platonic innatism must also be avoided, by which the science of all things is in our intellects by nature from the beginning.9 In short, although Olivi explicitly states that the thesis of "Illumination" is "famous and sound," he must be understood to accept it with restriction.10 Practically speaking , he endorses Illumination as a theological doctiine, applying to the rare cases of infused knowledge and to knowledge of the soul after death. And as his lengthy treatise on natural knowledge is unfolded, the lack of emphasis on supernatural help grows strikingly apparent. Ill NATURAL KNOWLEDGE I. Solidarity of Powers Olivi's whole noetic is radically dependent on the doctrine of the solidarity of the powers of the soul. The cognitive act is the result of many powers together as one, just as the motion of a rowed boat is contingent on the many individual motions of the oarsmen.11 Further, since all the powers in the soul share the same common matter, the "motion" of one power is the same as the motion of the common matter of another power. "For the various movements of the powers contain in their acts and objects connections with one another."12 This "inner motion" or colligatio "consists chiefly in the formal union of the spirit to the body as to its matter and of the body to the spirit as to its form . . . Secondarily the colligation is a...

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