Some Reflections on German Value Theory

SOME REFLECTIONS ON GERMAN VALUE THEORY AGerman philosopher in considering the field of contemporary Ethics points out how in the words of Schopenhauer 'it is easy to preach morals but difficult to ground them.' It is certainly true that today more than ever before we need the soundest foundation for a truelydemonstrable Ethics. It can be shown that there is not a single affirmation in morals which is not contradicted by its opposite. Eduard Von Hartmann at the beginning of the twentieth century could still maintain that the differences of opinion in Ethics are concerned with questions of general principle rather than with the concrete applications of these principles. On the other hand, Edward Westermarck holds that the concrete moral customs differ radically amongst different nations, especially among the primitive peoples, and the agreement of opinion is found only as regards general principles.1 Twelve years before the publication of Westermarcks work, G. E. Moore wrote practically the same thing.a In an effort to give moral philosophy a more fundamental basis we are compelled to consider the concrete material ethics of values in German thought. Hartmann was one of the leaders of this group of philosophers and he declared that only this kind of Ethics can solve the most difficult problems we meet in Kant and Nietzsche as well as the profoundest ethical questions of ancient and modern times.3 Within the scope of this paper we would like to examine the claims made by this philosopher as well as to attempt an analysis of one particular theory of value—the interest theory. 1 E. Westermarck: 'The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas,' 1924, vol. II, P. 742 : 'The moral ideas of mankind . . . present radical differences. A mode of conduct which among one people is condemned as wrong is among other people viewed with indifference or regarded ... as a duty . . . But at the same time . . . the general uniformity of human nature accounts for . . . similarities.' % G.E. Moore :Ethics, 1912, P. 94 : 'Ifwe lookattheextraordinarydifference» that there have been and are between different races of mankind and in different stages of society in respect to the classes of actions and particular actions which have been regarded as right and wrong it is . . . scarcelj possible to doubt that in some societies actions have been regarded with actual feelings of positive moral approval towards which many of us would feel the strongest disapproval.' 3 JV. Hartmann: Ethics (translated by Stanton Coit), 1932, vol.1, p. 17. 8»115 ??6T. A. WASSMER Max Scheler promulgated this new ethical doctrine of value in German thought in 1913 and 1916 in the 'Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung,' in a treatise of some length entitled 'Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik.' Scheler has himself stated that his doctrine in its widest aspects is in strict opposition to Kant's Critique of Practical Reason which is evident from the sub-title of the first and most important part of his essay — 'With special reference to Kant's Ethics.' Historically, it is easy to see why in the nineteenth century in both England and Germany there was a return to Kant. In both countries there was a reaction against positivistic and hedonistic Ethics in the direction of Kantian morality because in the latter could be discovered a defense for an absolutely universal ethical law that would be valid without any reference to empirical changing sentiments. In this historical association, then, there is a meetingground between Scheler and Kant in that both agree that the ethically valuable can only be given for us a priori, not a posteriori, by empirical altering circumstances and events. Scheler likewise agrees with Kant and with NeoKantianism that knowledge a priori is not an inborn, innate knowledge , to be found in us earlier than all other experiences but that it is a priori in logical significance and not in time. A value a priori is not therefore a value we know already at our birth before we know other things; but avalue aprioriis avalue which can never be depreciated, which can never become valueless by any new experience. Therefore, both Scheler and Kant seek after absolutely firm ethical...