C.S.J. The Harmony of Goodness. Mutuality and Moral Living according to John Duns Scotus by M. B. Ingham (review)

356BOOK REVIEWS 62), the pilgrimage motif in Rosicrucian thought (pp. 163-75), and the impact of the heroic, chivalric ideal on eighteenth-century alchemists, Freemasons, and romantic writers (pp. 177-199). Access ?? Weslern Esotericism concludes with fifty pages of annotated bibliography, including an analysis of libraries that possess special collections of esoteric thought. In short, Faivre has written a provocative study of an elusive term, and has provided the reader with an indispensable vade mecum for additional research on the subject. St. Bonavenlure UniversityJOHN MULRYAN M. B. Ingham, C.S.J. The Harmony of Goodness. Mutuality and Moral Living according to John Duns Scotus (Quincy, IL: The Franciscan Press, 1996). xix + 159 pp. Those who expect an expositio Hieraus of Scotus's moral theory will be disappointed with Ingham's book. It is often difficult to determine where Scotus ends and Ingham begins and vice-versa which, of course, is not meant as criticism. The author has rather chosen to use aesthetic analogies (wind chimes, harmony, beauty) in an attempt to present a holistic and edifying philosophicotheological picture—adaptable to modern thought—of the views of John Duns Scotus, the Subtle Doctor. Hence, readers will not find a 'dry' philosophy or a 'dry' theology in this book. It is rather frankly inspirational and at least implicitly exhortatory, combining philosophy and theology to spirituality. In what may pass as the understatement of the century, Ingham remarks (p. xiii) that "Scotus does not present a perspective which can be reduced to easy schema and mathematical formula." Ingham, in this reviewer's opinion, has done well to focus on the common good—so sadly neglected and ignored by contemporary U.S. society. In a somewhat extraordinary passage, Scotus is quoted (p. 132) as saying that God is the common good. As the common good, He is the measure and standard of all and no respecter of persons whether rich or poor, black, brown or white, powerful or helpless. Not unrelated is the oft-quoted adage (neo-Platonic, if you BOOK REVIEWS357 will) by Scotus that all plurality and diversity ought to be reduced to unity insofar as this is possible. A second key notion is divine and human freedom (not LICENCE or ARBITRARINESS)—so often distorted by many so called exegetes of the thought of Scotus and Ockham. Communality and liberty, in turn, are meant to culminate in charity, the amor Dei et proximi, so central to Scotus's Franciscan predecessors, particularly Bonaventure. In contrast to what has been called "Radical Aristotelianism" which said "How far can reason go without the help of theology?", Scotus's approach is one which would say 'How much AristotelianAvicennism can be accomodated without contaminating the Christian theological heritage as handed down from the Fathers of the Church and subsequently interpreted by intervening theologians?' As Ingham rightly points out (p. 7), Bonaventure's, as well as Scotus's, theology will not tolerate a study of man as cut off from his divine origins. Such a study is sterile and cannot be 'edifying', because once cut off, man cannot be raised up. In stating that the union between the three persons of the divinity is both necessary and free (pp. 18-19), Ingham slips by an extraordinary view of Scotus, viz. that the spiration of the Holy Spirit by the Father and Son is both necessary and free. This view is transferred mutatis mutandis to the free participation of the blessed in the beatific vision. Freedom of choice—somewhat by contrast—characterizes the human will in its pilgrim state, where the individual must make choices among good means to achieve his/her destiny. In other words, to have to choose is a matter of imperfection. Despite Ingham's clear exposition (pp. 30-32), many contemporaries will find this hard to assimilate. Scotus's distinction between natural and free causes is proverbial , such that only beings with free wills are truly rational. An intellect, devoid of free will, would be like any other natural cause, acting necessarily and without any potency toward acting contingently. Scotus has anticipated the objections of the Skinnerean stimulus-response psychologist who asks for a proof of freedom. Freedom cannot be proved or disproved; it is...