Philosophy of Language: A Contemporary Introduction (review)

Suitable for all students of philosophy of language, this introductory textbook covers issues falling broadly within four categories: theories of reference (e.g. definite descriptions, proper names, direct reference); theories of meaning (e.g. meaning as ideas in the mind, meaning as propositions, Wittgensteinian views on the use of language, Paul Grice’s psychological program, verificationism, Donald Davidson’s theory of truth-conditional meaning, plus the intentional theories based on the notion of possible worlds); pragmatics and speech acts (e.g. issues in the semantics/pragmatics interface, illocutionary force, implicatures, performatives); and the ‘dark side’ of nonliteral meaning, namely metaphors. Each chapter comes with an overview, summary, a list of questions for discussion and reflection, and suggestions for further reading.

Since this book is advertised as a contemporary introduction, one is intrigued to know precisely how contemporary it is. The answer is encouraging. The book is not contemporary in the sense that it delves into the intricacies of any of the views and theories introduced. Rather, the subtitle appears to mean, among other things, that the material on historical aspects of philosophy of language is kept very limited (e.g. details of Gottlob Frege’s philosophy are suppressed almost entirely, and considerable preference is given to pedagogical and presentational matters).

The book introduces the basics of the theories of language mentioned in the previous list and explores them thoroughly by means of objections to them and possible replies to these objections. The exploration is kept simple and is not marred with additional details. An elementary knowledge of logic and philosophy suffices for a reader to enjoy it. I believe that it is precisely these kinds of elementary books that will benefit scholars, because elementary presentations encourage genuinely fresh thinking, starting from nuts and bolts, revitalizing ideas thought to be dormant. For example, is verificationism as wrong as its reputation would have us believe? Just one among the many virtues of this book is its attempt to encourage its readers to independently reevaluate this issue. Lycan gives preference to original formulations of theories over commentaries and emphasizes the continuity of ideas rather than what individual philosophers have said on the matter. In the end, one is assured that there is much room for further, genuinely productive research in this fascinating field.