Nuclear Papers (review)

David Owen’s Nuclear Papers provides some formerly top secret documentary gems and shrewd insights into the agonizing decisions that Britain’s Labour government faced in the latter half of the 1970s as it struggled to maintain an independent strategic nuclear deterrent.

But first a little background information. In the late 1960s, the British Government was becoming increasingly concerned about the U.S. commitment to Europe, as more U.S. troops were withdrawn to fight in Vietnam and doubts grew about the U.S. government’s willingness to extend its “nuclear umbrella” to protect its allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

British concerns were exacerbated by the development of the Soviet antiballistic missile (ABM) system that threatened to reduce Britain’s ability to destroy Moscow, long the central requirement for the British nuclear deterrent. Although the United States had more than enough missiles to swamp Soviet ABM defenses, the British did not; they needed to enhance their Polaris submarine-launched warheads so that they could reach their targets. In 1973 the United States canceled the Super-Antelope project that was intended to do just that.

When the Conservative government of Edward Heath decided to go it alone, Defence Secretary Lord Carrington said that the project should have a new codename that was British or at least Imperial. Enquires with the London Zoo revealed that the only big antelope meeting that requirement was South African—and was called Chevaline. Lord Carrington was not put off by a name that was sometimes used by French establishments selling horsemeat.

Harold Wilson, who headed the minority Labour Government that came to power in 1974, decided to press ahead with the Chevaline project, with the support of a small group of ministers and senior officials. The intense secrecy surrounding the project stemmed not simply from fear that Moscow might learn about the doubts surrounding the viability of the British nuclear deterrent, but also because of strong opposition within the Labour Party to any further enhancement of British nuclear forces. A leak could have brought the government down.

The need for secrecy was all the greater after 1975 when the chief of the Defence Staff informed the defence secretary that the Moscow ABM was more effective than had earlier been thought. This meant that until Chevaline came into service seven years later, Britain “could have no assurance” of destroying Moscow (p. 6). This judgment highlighted the question of how much damage the United Kingdom needed to inflict for its deterrent to be credible. Some argued that Britain should sidestep Moscow and concentrate on obliterating other major Soviet cities.

After becoming foreign secretary in 1977 Owen joined the “Chevaline Group” and the debate about deterrence. At a meeting with senior Foreign Office officials on 17 October 1977 he said the central question was not whether Britain could be 100 percent certain that in all circumstances its missiles could hit Moscow, but whether the Soviet leaders could be 100 percent confident that the missiles would not strike Moscow. Less than a 100 percent probability might still be adequate for deterrence purposes. He also believed that the Soviet leadership would be deterred if Britain had the capability to destroy other major cities.

For those officials responsible for nuclear policy, the driving formula on percentages was that there had to be only a 5 percent risk that Britain would use strategic nuclear weapons for the Soviet Union to be deterred—provided there was a 100 percent certainty that, if used, the weapons would inflict “unacceptable” damage.

Owen’s assessment of what would deter the Soviet Union led him to argue that Britain should consider switching from a “continuous at sea deterrent” based on submarine-launched ballistic missiles to one using cruise missiles that would also be armed with nuclear warheads. This idea gained little support among officials dealing with nuclear strategy. They argued that cruise missiles could not guarantee success; nor did a non-Moscow criterion that covered only a small number of cities. The other members of the inner circle agreed with this...