Communist Bloc Expansion in the Early Cold War: Challenging Realism, Refuting Revisionism

Communist Bloc Expansioni nthe Early Cold W i Challenpng Realism, Refuting Revisionism Douglas J. Macdonald Iw a s there ever a unified communist threat facing the United States during the Cold War? Or did U.S. decision-makers misperceive Soviet and communist bloc ”defensiveness ” and ”caution”as expansionist threats?Did U.S. leaders, realizing that the Sovietsand their ideologicalallies posed no security threat to the United States and its allies, create such claims for various domestic political reasons? Such questions have dominated analyses of the Cold War in the United States for the past thirty years. To the surprise of some and the consternation of others, the demise of the Cold War and the resulting flow of new evidence from the East in recent years has reinvigorated many of these arguments over its origins, the primary responsibility for its creation, and US. actions during that era. The Cold War is over, but the controversies surrounding it and its meaning for contemporary scholarship and policy are not.’ The argument over the origins of the Cold War is important not only for historical accuracy but also for the consequences it will have on theoretical questions and therefore on their implications for policy. Since international relations specialists both learn from historical examples and utilize them as illustration and evidence, historical accounts and their relative plausibility directly influence social science theories. As the late William T.R. Fox used to tell his students, good history will not necessarily lead to good theory,but poor Douglas 1.Macdonald is Associate Professor of Political Science at Colgute University I would like to express my deep gratitude for the valuable comments and advice that I received from Chen Jian, David Edelstein, Hao Yufan, Robert G. Kaufman, Timothy Lomperis, Edward Rhodes, Randall Schweller,James Wirtz, and anonymous reviewers. 1. For recent discussions of the new evidence, see Jacob Heilbrunn, “The Revision Thing,” The New Republic, August 15, 1994, pp. 31-34, 36-39; Gideon Rose, ”The New Cold War Debate,” The National Interest, No. 38 (Winter 1994/95),pp. 89-96; Steven Merritt Miner, ”Revelations,Secrets, Gossip and Lies: Sifting Warily Through the Soviet Archives,” The New York Times Book Reuiew, May 14,1995,pp. 19-21; Karen J. Winkler, ”ScholarsRefight the Cold War,” The Chronicles of Higher Education, March 2, 1994, pp. ASAIO. International Security, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Winter 1995/96), pp, 152-188 0 1995 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 152 Communist Bloc Expansion in the Early Cold War I 153 history will lead to poor theory. History lays the groundwork for the creation, testing, and improvement of international theories. This articleutilizes some of the new historical treatments of evidence emerging from the East to re-examine the validity of Western perceptions of Soviet bloc expansion in the early Cold War. It begins with a discussion of the major schools of historical thought on the Cold War and their respective views on communist expansion: traditionalism, revisionism, post-revisionism, and realism . I maintain that many of the new interpretationsof the Cold War based on the new evidence support a traditional explanation and pose a challenge to the other schools of thought. Supporting evidence is provided by recent British and European scholarshipon Western threat perceptions during the Cold War. I then examine two empirical questions: did a relatively hierarchical and unified Communist bloc exist under the leadership of the Soviet Union? If so, were the perceptionsof Western decision-makersaccurate, that such a bloc was expansionist along coordinated lines largely directed from Moscow? I answer both questions in the affirmative. The first answer is based on the ample circumstantialevidence utilized by traditionalists in the past. The second answer relies on new interpretationsand primary evidence that strongly support the earlier traditionalist claims. Taken together, the supporting, circumstantial, and new primary evidence provide a compellingargument that the traditional explanation of the Cold War is superior to the competing explanations. A case study of the bloc’s interventions in Asia explores in greater detail the question of bloc solidarity.With Europe and the Middle East denied them as targets of opportunity by 1948, the Soviets turned to Asia. I argue that Soviet...