Chinese Perspectives on Nuclear Arms Control

ChinesePerspectives onNuclearArms Control Banning N. Garrett 6 Bonnie S. Glaser I China’s nuclear weapons and Beijing’s arms control policies have become increasingly important factors in the post-cold War era of U.S.-Russianstrategic arms reductions and growing concern about proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Unlike Russia and the United States, China is not constrained by any international arms control regime from modernizing and expanding its nuclear forces. In addition, the Chinese nuclear arsenal, the quality of which is likely to be significantly enhanced over the coming decade, will be an increasingly important strategicfactor in regional and global securityas China’s nuclear weapons more closely match the capabilitiesof U.S. and Russian nuclear forces.Concern about Beijing’s nuclear capability has also been heightened by China’s rapid emergence as a major power with a huge economy, able to underwrite an extensive nuclear arms buildup in the next century should Chinese leaders choose to do so. Uncertainty about China’s nuclear weapons capabilities, its strategic intentions , and the long-run goals of its nuclear modernization program is exacerbated by China’s lack of transparency in the military sphere. Beijing could be striving to become a full-service nuclear power on a qualitative par with the United States and Russia, which would provide Chinese leaders with a wide range of strategic options in a crisis or wartime; or, instead, the Chinese may have the more modest objective of enhancing the credibility of a minimal deterrent force. China has an increasingly significantimpact not only on the strategicnuclear balance but also on nuclear arms control efforts. Beijing can block or advance many key arms control processes. It could be a spoiler in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiations under way at the United Nations Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. Without China’s agreement, a CTBT is not likely to be completed and would be largely meaninglessin any case if it were signed only by the other nuclear powers. Similarly,the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (“T) would be substantially weakened if China as a nuclearBanning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser are Washington-based consultants on Asian affairs. They have visited China annually since 1983 to discuss strategic issues with Chinese analysts and officials. The authors would like to thank Alastair Iain Johnston and Paul H.B. Godwin for their insightful comments on an earlier draft of this article. Znternational Security, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Winter 1995/96),pp, 43-78 0 1995by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 43 International Security 20:3 I 44 weapon state capable of exporting nuclear weapons technology were not a signatoxy.In the long run, Beijing could block future effortsto reach agreement among the five declared nuclear powers to drastically reduce their strategic nuclear weapons. China’s involvementin multilateralarms control has been largelya reluctant response to international political pressure. Nevertheless, there is increasing support in Beijing for the view that China obtains security benefits from participation in international arms control regimes. Whether backing for this view will continue to grow is unclear, however, especially in light of China’s growing mistrust of the United States in the aftermath of the Clinton administration ’s decision in May 1995to permit Taiwan’s president, Lee Teng-hui, to make a “private” visit to his alma mater, Cornell University. In formulating their arms control and nuclear modernization policies, the Chinese react to China’s perceived ”threat environment,” which includes Beijing’s assessment of U.S.strategicintentionstoward China. Chinese leadershave become increasingly suspiciousthat the United Statesis pursuing a new containmentstrategy against China and may conclude that the potential military threat posed to China by the United States and other powers requires strengthening China’s nuclear weapons capability. Over the long run, if mutual trust and confidence cannot be restored in U.S.-Chinese relations, the Chinese are likely to be less cooperative with the United States on international arms control issues, especially efforts to halt proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to eschew participation in nuclear arms control regimes that place limitations on Chinese forces. This could even includeChineseunwillingnessto agree to a comprehensivenuclear test ban, particularly if the United States proceeds with...