The False Premise of Realism

Realism1 J o h n J. Mearsheimer’s latest missive in defense of the neorealist homeland targets tous les azirnuts in the camp of institutionalism.*The other contributors to this symposium take up Mearsheimer’s treatment of the institutionalist literature. I am concerned here with the policy dimensions of his anti-institutionalist posture. The brevity of this note permits me only to sketch out three counterpoints to Mearsheimer’s analysis. First, U.S. policymakers after World War I1 went out of their way to ignore the anti-institutionalism that Mearsheimer would have us adopt today. Second, had postwar U.S. policymakers accepted Mearsheimer’s views about the irrelevance of international institutions, the international security environment today would not only be different but would pose far greater challengesthan it does. Third, the unfavorable view of realism which some U.S. policymakers historically have held is not a product of mushy thinking, as Mearsheimer suggests, but of their grasp of a distinctive feature of America’s geopolitical situation which continues to prevail today. These facts register poorly if at all, on Mearsheimer’s neorealist radar screen. As a result, the analytical basis of his force de fruppe against institutionalism entails serious and potentially dangerous limits as a guide for U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold War world. Realism and Institutions after World War I1 Postwar America pursued its interests and sought to manage the changing international balance of power; that no one questions. But in doing so, U.S. policymakersalso had certain institutional objectives in mind, as evidenced by their stance toward the United Nations, the creation of NATO, and European unification. And at every turn, they faced opposition for this stancefrom realist anti-institutionalists.I enumerate some of the highlights. John Gerard Ruggie is Dean of the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University. For helpful comments, I thank Richard Betts, Edward Mansfield, JackSnyder,Anders Stephanson, Steve Weber, and Mark Zacher. 1. JohnJ. Mearsheimer, “TheFalse Promise of International Institutions,” International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 5-49. International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995),pp. 62-70 0 1995by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 62 The False Premise of Realism I 63 Franklin Roosevelt’s initial concept for the organization of the postwar security order was regional: his ”four policemen” scheme. But he realized that ”the only appeal which would be likely to carry weight with the United States public . . . would be one based upon a world-wide conception.”2Hence, Roosevelt adopted a hybrid design for the United Nations: a collective security organization based in a concert of power, to be used by, but not against, the permanent members of the SecurityCo~ncil.~ To be credible, this concert-based systemrequired an enforcement capability.“Weare not thinking of a superstate with its own police force and other paraphernalia of coercive power,” Roosevelt noted not long before the Dumbarton Oaks conference, at which the major powers agreed upon the enforcementprovisions of the UN charter. Instead, he said, they planned to devise a mechanism for ”jointaction” by national forces4 George Kennan, soon to become celebrated as a realist practitioner and then serving in the Moscow embassy, urged “burying” the Dumbarton Oaks proposals . “We are badly enmeshed in our own unsound slogans,”he admonished Washington in an unsolicited cable.5His advice was ignored. Once Congress approved the charter in December 1945, the major powers proceeded to negotiate hefty UN standby forces.6Gradually,these talks fell victim to the emerging cold war. The Eisenhower administration in 1956facilitated the invention of the more modest UN collective security mechanism known as peacekeeping. The Suez crisis provided the occasion. When Israel, Britain, and France launched their coordinated attacks against Egypt, Eisenhower was furious. “All right,” he instructed his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, “Foster, you tell ’em, goddamn it, we’re going to apply sanctions,we’re going to the United Nations, we’re going to do everything that there is so we can stop this thing.”7Eisenhower did all of that, beginning with U.S.-sponsored UN resolutions calling for an immediate cease-fireand the withdrawal of foreign forces.Under...