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Toward an American Grand Strategy after Bipolarity ~ D u r i n g the Forty Years War, also known as the Cold War, America's grand strategy was both elegant and efficient.It consisted of one word: "containment," and its purpose was the "break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power.' Having achieved both objectives, the United States was left without a grand strategy. George Bush, who presided over the demise of the Soviet empire, invoked the "New World Order." Accompanied by the rapid growth of disorder? this concept did not a grand strategy make. Decisions were made on an ad-koc basis. Order was restored in the Gulf, but not in Serbia. American troops were inserted in Somalia, but not in Angola where the humanitarian toll was much more horrifying. Nor has Bill Clinton enunciated a grand strategy. Indeed, it is precisely in foreign policy where the "domestic President" looks least impressive. "Waffling," "Carteresque," "amateurish" are some of the epithets. In the Clinton era, the United States has behaved like a "neurotic lion."3 His growl has been worse than his bite, and his erratic behavior has flummoxed friends and foes alike. What might explain this failure to define a grand strategy? And what should it be? Is the failure due to Clinton, the person? Or to America, a society that is exceptional in its assets, aspirations and afflictions? Or to the post-bipolar setting, the "international system," that no longer imposes the discipline of the The author is a columnist and editorial page editor of the Suddeutsche Zeitung. He is an Associate of the john M . Olin Institute of Strategic Studies, Harvard University, and a member of its "Project on the Changing Security Environment and the American National Interest" under whose auspices a longer verson of this article was written. The author would like to thank George Liska and Robert W. Tucker for their critique of an earlier draft of this article. 1. George F. Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 2 (July 1947), reprinted in Hamilton Fish Armstrong, ed., Fifty Years of Foreign Affairs (New York: Praeger, 1972), p. 205. 2. An abbreviated list: the Gulf War, Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, Rwanda, internal war in Turkey, and low-level war on the southern periphery of Russia, including open Russian intervention in Chechnya . 3. Michael Elliott, "The Neurotic Lion: America's Skittishness About Committing to War Causes Global Problems," Newsweek (International), September 26, 1994, p. 23. Znternational Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 94-117 0 1995by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 94 “Bismarck” OY “Britain“? i 95 Cold War, nor grants the sweet lassitude of an insularity long past? The answer, limned in the first part of this article, is: All of the above, the system being the weightiest variable. The second part presents two historical models of statecraft , abbreviated as “Britain”and “Bismarck,”which seem particularly fitting for a pre-eminent but not hegemonic power like the United States. The third part argues for a grand strategy entitled “Globalizing Bismarck,” and does so in terms of neo-realist theory, which regards one variable as decisive:a nation’s position in the international structure qua distribution of power.4 The Man, the Society and the System What is the source of America’s failure to define a grand strategy in the post-Cold War world? Is it the man, the society, or the international system? THE MAN Bill Clinton’s problem is not a lack of conviction, but a surfeit thereof He believes in too many things, either all at once or in short sequence, and that does not make for steadiness of purpose. Worse, there is no unifying concept that might impose a hierarchy on the bounty of his sentiments. That distinguishes Clinton from his recent predecessorswho had at least either conviction or coherence. Ronald Reagan, no conceptualizer, had both: robust beliefs that were tightly harnessed. Richard Nixon may have had few principles, but they were fused together by a single idea-call it realpolitik in pursuit of American preeminence. George Bush lacked that kind of philosophy, but in the run...

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