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Against the B-2 I National security is enhanced when it is informed by vigorous public debate. Therefore, I welcome the critique of my recent International Security article on the future of the manned bomber offered by Donald Rice, the Secretary of the U.S. Air Force. It is important to clarify what the debate between Secretary Rice and me is not about. It is not about the importance of maintaining the U.S. strategic triad. We agree that the United States must deploy formidable intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM),and manned bomber forces, and that it must do so for the foreseeable future. Thus, we agree that the United States needs manned aircraft in its strategic force structure. Indeed, I have been a strong supporter of the B-1B for years; the B-1B is a modern, cost-effective system with impressive penetration and cruise missile carrying capabilities.2However, I am not persuaded by the Air Force’s arguments for building its latest bomber, the B-2. Rice, on the other hand, supports the 8-2 wholeheartedly. This is where he and I part company. Although Rice makes the best case I have yet seen for the B-2 bomber, his case is nonetheless a weak one. His arguments are vigorous, but not rigorous. To be more specific, four points must be kept in mind in weighing the merits of the B-2 program. The author would like to thank John Cross, Ivo Daalder, Renee de Nevers, Francois Heisbourg, Don Kerr, John Mearsheimer, Diego Ruiz Palmer, and Jack Snyder for their assistance with this article. The arguments expressed herein are solely the author’s responsibility, however. Michael E. Brown is Senior Research Fellow in U.S. Security Policy at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), London. He is the author of Flying Blind: Decision Making in the U.S. Strategic Bomber Program (Cornel2 University Press, forthcoming, 1991). 1. Donald Rice, “The Manned Bomberand StrategicDeterrence: The U.S. Air ForcePerspective,” International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990),pp. 100-128, Michael E. Brown, “The U.S. Manned Bomber and Strategic Deterrence in the 1990s,” Internationa! Security, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Fall 1989), pp. 5-46. 2. See Michael E. Brown, ”The Strategic Bomber Debate Today,” Orbis, Vol. 28, No. 2 (Summer 1984), pp. 365-388; Brown, ”B-2 or Not 8-2: Crisis and Choice in the U.S. Strategic Bomber Programme,” Survival, Vol. 30, No. 4 (July-August 1988), pp. 351-366. See also Brown, ”The U.S. Manned Bomber,” pp. 44-45. International Security, Summer 1990 (Vol. 15, No. 1) 0 1990by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and of the Massachusetts lnstitute of Technology 129 International Security 25:Z I 230 First, although there are good reasons for having manned aircraft in the strategic force structure, many of these requirements are met by stand-off cruise missile carriers, such as the B-52 and, in the future, the B-1B. The case for pure penetrating bombers, such as the 8-2, is less ~ompelling.~ Rice blurs the distinction between cruise missile carriers and penetrating bombers in an unsuccessful attempt to patch together a strategic rationale for the B-2. In addition, he exaggerates the contributions the B-2 would make to the U.S. defense posture as well as the risks the United States would run if it decided to cancel the stealth bomber program. Second, if we accept Ibce’s contention that Soviet strategic forces will be modernized in the 1990s, then Soviet SLBM capabilities could pose prelaunch survivability problems for American bomber forces in the future. Particularly worrisome is the potential vulnerability of SAC’S tanker fleet, upon which the B-2 will depend. Rice, however, assumes away the surprise attack problem by insisting that modern reconnaissance technology will not fail and that American leaders will always respond to hints of an impending attack by putting U.S. forces on a high state of alert. However, history tells us not to be sanguine on either count. Moreover, Rice fails to analyze the tanker vulnerability issue systematically. Third, the B-2‘s true costs are much greater than Air...

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