The Manned Bomber and Strategic Deterrence: The U.S. Air Force Perspective

and Strategic Deterrence The U.S. Air Force Perspective IB y the late 1970s, the continued viability of the B-52 as a penetrating bomber had become increasingly doubtful in the face of modernized Soviet air defenses. To reinvigorate the deterrent capability of the bomber fleet, the United States Air Force (USAF) received Congressional support in 1981 to proceed with a timephased ”two bomber” program. The USAF procured 100 B-1Bs to meet nearterm needs and provide a breathing space in which to develop the revolutionary B-2 at a prudent pace. Incorporating “stealth” technologies that reduce its signature in a wide array of spectra, the B-2 now stands poised to enter operational service within the next few years as the cornerstone of the Air Force’s modernized bomber fleet. Both applause and criticismgreeted the B-2 after its rollout. Few questioned the revolutionary potential offered by the B-2’s unique design, construction, and capabilities, but many criticized its cost. Michael E. Brown’s article in the Fall 1989 issue of this journal, ”The U.S. Manned Bomber and Strategic Deterrence in the 1990s,” argues that the B-2 will not be cost-competitive or survivable compared with other strategic systems, particularly in a Soviet ”bolt-out-of-the-blue” attack. To address Dr. Brown’s concerns and interject an element of operational and fiscal reality, this article focuses on the B-2 and strategic modernization to provide interested readers with the Air Force perspective. It was originally written before the Department of Defense (DoD)conducted a review of major aircraft programs, but has been updated to reflect changes resulting from the reduction in the planned buy of B-2s from 132 to 75 aircraft. The article first discusses the B-2‘s contribution to U.S. security in the decades to come. It then addresses the implausibility of Brown’s assumed scenario, illustrates the bomber’s high pre-launch survivability, and provides a more accurate depiction of bomber cost. Donald Rice is U.S. Secretary of the Air Force 1. Michael E. Brown, “The U.S. Manned Bomber and Strategic Deterrence in the 1990s,” Znternationd Security, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Fall 1989), pp. 4-45. Internatiomi Security, Summer 1990 (Vol. 15, No. 1) 01990 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 100 The Manned Bomber and Strategic Deterrence I 101 The B-2's Contribution to U.S. National Security The maintenance of a stable, deterring nuclear balance vis-u-vis the Soviet Union must remain paramount-only Soviet nuclear forces threaten our very existence. While the Soviets appear to be shifting their focus toward addressing long-standing internal economic, political, and societal problems, Soviet military capabilities built up during twenty years of relentless growth in Soviet defense spending remain. Despite changes in rhetoric, the Soviets have continued an unabated modernization of all components of their strategic offensive forces. The United States must base its deterrent posture on the potential threat posed by these improving capabilities, not on declarations of intent by a single Soviet leader. Deterrence is the centerpiece of U.S. national military strategy. To ensure deterrence of nuclear attack, the United States relies on three complementary weapon systems, commonly known as the "legs" of the triad: intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and manned bombers. The legs each possess certain unique characteristics and synergistically work together to provide a retaliatory capability that no adversary could hope to neutralize fully. The triad also provides a high-confidence barrier against technological breakthroughs, system failures, communication limitations, and unforeseeable "fog of war" factors. The strategic triad has provided an effective deterrent for three decades and has led to a broad national consensus that we should maintain a balanced triad composed of modernized, effective individual legs. As stated above, the primary objective is to deter-not fight-a nuclear war. Therefore, evaluation scenarios should place a premium on force capabilities that will maintain deterrence as we move up the escalatory ladder. If deterrence fails, our objective then becomes effective warfighting at any level of conflict. Only in that situation is it appropriate to measure the value of...