A Farewell to Arms Control?

Correspondence A Farewell to Arms Control? To the Editors: Michael J. M ~ Z U ~ Y Richard K. Betts The first half of Richard Betts' article, "Systems for Peace or Causes of War?Collective Security, Arms Control, and the New Europe" (International Security, Vol. 17, No. 1, [Summer19921,pp. 5-43), makes a major contributionto clarifylngthe ongoing debate over international security systems. Betts soundly refutes the strictmodel of collective security, and his suggestion of an "Unorganized Pacified Europe" (WE) makes sense. Indeed, one wonders these days whether the United States needs a "grand strategy" at all, or whether we would be better served by a series of more ad-hoc regional strategies. In my opinion, however, the second half of the Betts article, his critique of arms control, fails to make its case. Even if Betts is right and we need a UPE rather than collective security, arms control can help preserve peace and stability in Europe in important ways. This is particularly true if arms control is conceived, as it should be, more broadly than simply as exercises in weapons reduction. Arms control is important today primarily to build trust and to reinforce the current trend of integration and reform on the Continent. If Europe is truly to become single, whole, and free, its nations must continue to build mutual trust and delegitimizethe use of force as a solution to international disputes. Arms control treaties can signal peaceful intent and symbolize a rejection of military adventurism. Betts does not agree. He contends that arms control will not help, and may imperil, security in Europe. His critiques, however, are off the mark. Betts makes a host of arguments, but I have grouped them for convenience into three primary categories: crisis realignment, offense dominance, and mobilization instability. I will consider his arguments individually, but they suffer from a number of common flaws. First, Betts discusses theoreticaldangers outside the context of the real world, the new Europe as it is developing. Second, he ignores the ability of nuclear weapons to help stabilize situations of conventional imbalance, as they have done so reliably since 1950. Third, he blames arms control for problems actually created by the collapse of communism; that collapse, and not the Treaty on ConvenMichael J. Mazarr is a Senior Fellow in lnternational Security Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. He holds a Ph.D. from the University of Maryland School of Public Affairs and is an adjunct professor at the Georgetown UniversityNational Security Studies Program. His research on arms control is made possible in part by a grant from the W. Alton Jones Foundation. Richard K. Betts is Professor of Political Science at Columbia University and Director of lnternational Security Policy Studies at its School of International and Public Affairs International Security,Vol. 17, No. 3 (Winter 1992/93),pp. 188-200 01992by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 188 Correspondence I 189 tional Forces in Europe (CFE) or other arms control measures, accounts for the suddenly disadvantageous position of Russia and other elements of instability. And fourth, Betts pays no attention to the U.S. role in Europe and how it might be used to mitigate the dangers of which he warns. CRISIS REALIGNMENT Each of these shortcomings is apparent in his first argument: that, after arms control treaties are in place, alliances or friendships involving states party to those treaties might fall apart. If states realign, the balances achieved in arms control will be thrown askew, creating instability.' First, this critique does not respect reality. Dramatic and fundamental realignments are extraordinarily unlikely. Would France realign with Russia? Germany with the United Kingdom? If one has any faith in the European Community process, the fracturing of the central France-Germany-UK axis is out of the question, even absent the troubled Maastricht treaty. Realignment on a lesser scale-Ukraine and Bulgaria against Romania, Romania and what is left of Serbian Yugoslavia against Hungarywould not pose a threat to fundamental U.S. interests, and should be manageable even through the efforts of a UPE. Moreover, if one looks at the military balances created by the CFE Treaty...