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i n Emerging Nuclear Nations I Reliable data on existing or developing systems of command and control in emerging nuclear nations are scarce. Therefore in this article I propose a general deductive framework for understanding the factors that will shape new command and control systems, to aid in assessing the details of each new nuclear nation’s policies as they become known. Traditional analyses of nuclear proliferation have stressed the capability of new arsenals, the ”irrationality” of certain regimes, the degree to which new nuclear nations may support the international status quo, or whether the countries in question are involved in acute conflicts. Accordingly, the traditional measures of the proliferation threat are arsenal size, foreign policies of the states, and assessments of the regional balances of power. These measures are useful for estimating what a new nuclear nation might intend to do with its arsenal, but they only tell part of the story. A more complete assessment also requires an estimate of how the nuclear organization itself might in fact behave, particularly during a crisis. A thorPeter D. Feauer is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Duke University. He is author of Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the United States (Cornell University Press, 2992). I wish to thank Stephen Biddle, Stephen Cimbala, Lauren Holland, Samuel Huntington, Joseph Kruzel, JosephNye, Stephen Rosen, Scott Sagan, members of the CFIA National Security Group at Harvard, members of the Mershon Center Foreign Policy and Technology Seminar at Ohio State University, and two anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful comments on drafts of this article. Research for this article was supported by the Mershon Center. 1. For the classic treatments, see Lewis Dunn, Containing Nuclear Proliferation, Adelphi Paper No. 263 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies [IISS], 1991);Lewis Dunn, Controlling the Bomb: Nuclear Proliferation in the 1980s (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982); Leonard Spector, Nuclear Proliferation Today (New York: Vintage Books, 1984);Leonard Spector, New Nuclear Nations (NewYork: Vintage Books, 1985);Leonard Spector, Going Nuclear: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1986-1987 (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1987); Leonard Spector, The Undeclared Bomb (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1988); and Leonard Spector, Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 1989-90 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1990).For a more recent discussion , see Brahma Chellaney, ”South Asia’s Passage to Nuclear Power,” International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 43-72; and Steve Fetter, “BallisticMissiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction: What is the Threat? What Should be Done?” International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 5-42. For a more sanguine assessment, see Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons:More May be Better, Adelphi Paper No. 171 (London: IISS, 1981). Internationnl Security, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Winter 1992/93),pp. 160-187 01992 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 160 Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Nations 1 161 ough threat assessment should factor in likely failure modes of new nuclear arsenals. This depends, in turn, upon an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the command and control system, including identification of how the weapons are handled on a day-to-daybasis and how the new nuclear state addresses fundamental safety and security concerns. While command and control has become a central topic in the study of U.S. nuclear policy,2it has received only cursory treatment in most proliferation studies. For instance, Kenneth Waltz’s iconoclastic argument that nuclear proliferation may enhance stability rests on the largely undefended assertion that new nuclear nations will “solve” the command and control problem and build stable and secure arsenal^.^ Other analyses have discussed the special challenges confronting command and control in new nuclear states-e.g., nuclear terrorism, coups d’etat, and acute vulnerability-but most have shied away from generalizable assessments of the command and control pr~blem.~ This paper proposes to fill this gap in the literature with a framework that categorizes types of command and control systems and then identifies key factors that influence their shape. 2. See, e.g., Desmond Ball, Can Nuclear War Be Controlled? Adelphi Paper No. 169 (London: IISS, 1981);Paul Bracken, The Command and Control...


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