The Sanctions Glass: Half Full or Completely Empty?

Half Full or Completely Empty? ~ I n “Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work,”’ Robert Pape sets up a straw man and then boldly proceeds to knock it down. His target is an “emerging optimism” about sanctions, which in his oversimplified characterization says that economic sanctions-used in isolation from other tools-are ”as effective as military force and more humane” (p. 90).But policy analysts-and certainly policymakerswho are looking for ways to strengthen sanctions and make them more effective are generally far more nuanced in their conclusions and more limited in their expectationsof what sanctions can achieve than Pape asserts. And in the wake of the experiencesin Iraq and Haiti, few suggest that economic sanctions are necessarily more humane or that their use can be justified regardless of the humanitarian consequences. While my disagreements with Pape’s methods are many, the Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott (hereafter HSE) bottom line on the utility of economic sanctions is not terribly different.2Although Pape cites our work as the “key evidence’’supporting the perceived optimism that sanctions can achievemajor foreign policy goals, he never cites our own interpretation of the evidence.We concluded that ”although it is not true that sanctions ’neverwork,’ they are of limited utility in achieving foreign policy goals that depend on compellingthe target country to take actionsit stoutly resists. . . .The success rate importantly depends on the type of policy or governmental change sought” (HSE 2d ed., vol. 1,pp. 92-93). Moreover, we found that the utility of sanctionshad declined Kimberly Ann Elliott is a Research Fellow at the Institute for International Economics. She is coauthor, with Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jefiey J. Schott, of Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3d ed. (Washington , D.C.: Institute for International Economics, forthcoming). Although scheduling conflictsprevented closer collaboration in this case, the author would like to thank Gary Clyde Hufbauer and JeffreySchott for their thoughtful comments and suggestions on the article, and Elizabeth Winston for comments and research assistance.The views expressed here do not necessarily represent those of her coauthors or of the Director, Board of Directors, or Advisory Committee of the Institute for International Economics. 1. Robert A. Pape, ”Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work,” International Security, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Fall 1997),pp. 90-136. Subsequent cites to this article are in parentheses in the text. 2. Gary Clyde Hufbauer, JeffreyJ. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered , 2d rev. ed., 2 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics [IIE], 1990). Subsequent references to this article appear in parentheses in the text. International Security, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Summer 1998),pp. 5 0 4 5 0 1998by the Institute for International Economics. 50 The Sanctions Glass I 52 sharply over time, with less than one in four sanctions having any success at all in the 1970s and 1980s (ibid., pp. 105-1061, even fewer when the United States acts nila ate rally.^ Nevertheless, the flip side of declining utility is that economic sanctions, in our judgment, were a relatively effectivetool of U.S. foreign policy in the early post-World War I1 era. Although increasinginternational economicintegration and declining political hegemony have eroded US. leverage, just over half the episodes in which the United States took a leading role from 1945 to 1970 resulted in at least partial success.In that context, our research can be used as a source for ideas about how to strengthen sanctions and make them a more effective foreign policy instrument. In order to knock down the straw man he has created and prove his assertion that sanctions cannot work, Pape must debunk the evidence that sanctions have ever worked. He argues that my colleagues and I wrongly counted as sanctions successes 35 of 40 cases, and that 5 successes is far too few to be optimistic about sanctions ever being effective.Pape arrives at this conclusion, however, by defining sanctions so narrowly and setting the bar for success so high that, indeed, few cases reach the threshold. He excludes cases where economic pressure is intended to complement military force, and he attributes policy success to economic sanctions only if it occurred in the absence of accompanying policies, such as military threats or covert...