Military Reform in Russia: Dilemmas, Obstacles, and Prospects

Refom i nRussia Dilemmas, Obstacles, and Prospects N o t sinceJune1941 has the Russian military stood as perilously close to ruin as it does now. More than fifty years ago the German Wehrmacht launched a massive offensive against the Soviet Union, and within three months Hitler's troops had reached the outskirtsof Moscow. The Red Army was near collapseand the defense industry on the verge of paralysis. In contrast, Russia's current military crisis is not the result of the actions of an external foe. Rather, it is the product of the combined ineptitude and neglect of Russia's freely elected leadership, unchecked corruption and mismanagement of an untamed bureaucracy, and increasing fragmentation and infighting among Moscow's new political elite. Theseare but a few of the manifestationsresultingfrom the profound political, economic, and geostrategic transformation that Russia has experienced over the last decade.If Russia's mammoth military-industrialestablishmentwere to collapse-a distinct possibility in the next few years-the consequenceswould be no less devastating than were the events of June 1941 . . . not only for Russia but for the entire world. Debates and infightingover military reform are at the very core of Russia's domestic politics.This is not surprisinggiven the tremendousrole the military establishmenthas played throughout Russian history, including seven decades of communist rule during which the Soviet Union succeeded in building one of the worlds greatest military empires. At the same time, these internal struggles have broad political, economic, social, and foreign policy implications .' Russia's failed attemptsat reform since 1993have greatly exacerbated problems within the military, and have also caused huge disruptionsin the defense industry, both of which have remained relatively static in a society that has otherwise changed profoundly. At the same time, implementation of any of the various reform plans currentlyunder considerationmay just as likely bring about the collapse of the military as save it. Nevertheless, radical military Alexei G.Arbatov Alexei G. Arbatov is Deputy Chairman of the Committee on Defense in the Russian Duma. I. L. Rokhlin, "Address to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and to the Russian Military, June23,1997," Nezavisimoye Voennoe Obozrenie, No. 24 (June 5-11, 1997), pp. 2-3. International Security, Vol. 22, No.4 (Spring 19981,pp. 83-134 0 1998 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the MassachusettsInstitute of Technology. 83 International Security 2.24 1 84 reform must remain one of the primary elements of Russia‘s overall political, social, and economic reform package, because without it these other reforms will also be doomed. Certain economic reforms and political developments in Russia between 1992 and 1997 have not been conducive to military reform, and in many respects have severely hampered it. Radical military reform can succeed only if Russia’s current economic and political model of development is substantially revised. And as the Russian budget crisis of 1997clearly demonstrated, changes must be forthcoming if the economy is to be spared further disintegration and the likelihood of a major socialcrisis with potentially dire political consequences. Thus, in light of the unprecedented crisis within Russia’s armed forces and defense industry, military reform is not so much a matter of adjusting its defense posture to fit the post-Cold War security environment (as it is, for example, in the United States),but of saving Russia from irreversibleruin. Genuine military reform is also the only way to strengthen meaningful civilian control over Russia’s armed forces and defense policy, thus guaranteeing continued democratic development and assuring that its defense policy is in line with its security requirements and economic resources. Communist mechanisms of political controlover the militaryhave been destroyed, but new ones have yet to be created.Military reform is infeasiblewithout strong civilian political control over the defense establishment, which-like other large bureaucracies -is resistant to radical change. The post-Cold War degradation of Russia’s armed forces has also been detrimental to efforts to interact with the U.S. military establishment and to implement the Partnership for Peace program with NATO. Further, as conditions in the Russian armed forces continue to deteriorate-for example, in terms of equipment and combat readiness-the appeal of nationalistic, antidemocratic , anti-Western...