Rethinking the "Reagan Doctrine" in Angola

Rethhkmg ’ the “Reagan Doctrine”i n Angola Michael McFaul T h e American policy of assisting “freedom fighters” in their struggle against ”Marxist” regimes in the Third World-the so-called Reagan Doctrine-represents one of the most significantforeign policy innovations of the Reagan presidency. By the close of the Reagan administration, the policy appeared to have achieved sweeping results in forcing communism to retreat in Afghanistan, Angola, and Kampuchea . Proponents of the policy have attributed the 1988peace settlement between Angola, Cuba, and South Africa, and subsequent discussions on Angolan national reconciliation, to the Reagan Doctrine’s success.’ The author would like to thank David Abernethy, Kenneth Bobroff, Alexander George, Donna Norton, Terence Ranger, and John Vincent for comments on earlier drafts of this article, and Gerald Bender, David Holloway, John Marcum, and Robert Price for helpful suggestions. The author also would like to thank the Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University, for supporting the preparation of this article. Michael McFaul is a researchfellow at the Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University, and a doctoral candidate at Oxford University. 1. For examples of this argument, see John Fenton, “U.S. Still Will Back SavimbiDespite CeaseFire Pact,” Congressional Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 25 (June 24, 1989), p. 1566; “Bush to Continue Aid to Rebels on Angola,“ New York Times, January 13, 1989, P. AS; Chas. W. Freeman, “The AngolaNamibia Accords,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 3(Summer 1989),p. 141;Howard Phillips, testimony before the Subcommittee on Africa, Foreign Affairs Committee, U.S. House of Representatives , September 27, 1989; and Steven R. David, “Why the Third World Matters,” Znternational Security, Vol. 14, No. 1(Summer 1989), p. 68. A ceasefire was signed in early August 1988, and the terms of the peace settlement were agreed in the ”Brazzaville Protocol,” announced in Brazzaville, Congo on December 13, 1988; the official peace treaty, called the “Tripartite Agreement,” was signed ceremoniously at the United Nations in New York on December 22, 1988. (The references “Brazzaville Protocol” and “Tripartite Agreement” are used interchangeably in this article.) Under the terms of these agreements, South Africa agreed to withdraw its military forces from Angola and establish a timetable for Namibian independence, in return for the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. Although not part of the official agreement, South Africa also promised to end support for the UNITA (UnifioNacional para a Independencia Total de Angola) in exchange for the closing of ANC (African National Congress of South Africa) military bases in Angola. An additional agreement between Angola and Cuba also was signed at the New York ceremony, outlining the timetable for the Cuban withdrawal from Angola. The texts of the Protocol of Brazzaville, the Tripartite Agreement between Angola, Cuba, and South Africa, and the Bilateral Agreement between Cuba and Angola are all published in Selected Documents, No. 32, United States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, December 1988. Although unofficialtalks about national reconciliationhad been underway for several months, the Angolan government and UNITA formally began negotiations at Gbadolite, Zaire on June ~~ ~ International Security, Winter 1989/90(Vol. 14, No. 3) 0 1989by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 99 International Security 24:3 1 100 Is this analysis correct? Did American assistance to anti-government forces play a positive role in encouraging peace in Angola? What other factors contributed to conflict resolution, and which were most instrumental? In answering these questions, this article seeks to evaluate the application of the Reagan Doctrine in Angola in the context of other local, regional, and international factors affecting the course of events there.2The article begins by outlining the origins of the Angolan conflict and then the evolution and implementation of the Reagan Doctrine in Angola. Other variables influencing the course of events in the region are identified and discussed: first, changes and continuities in the Angolan government’s approach to negotiations ; second, the impact of “new thinking” in the Soviet Union on the situation in Angola; and third, the importance of recent shifts in the military balance in southern Africa. I will argue that the settlement between Angola, Cuba, and South Africa was achieved...