On the Wrong Track?: An Assessment of MX Rail Garrison Basing

On the Wrong Track? An Assessment of MX Rail Garrison Basing I I n December 1986, President Reagan announced his decision to proceed with a two-track approach to intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) modernization. He recommended full scale development of the SmallICBM in hard mobile launchers (HML), to be based at Minuteman launch sites and possibly also at random-movement complexes in the southwestern United States. He also called for engineering development to begin on a rail garrison basing (RGB) concept for the Peacekeeper ICBM (MX), in which missiles would be placed on railroad cars and stationed, during peacetime, at garrisons located on militarybases. During times of national emergency, the trains would disperse from these garrisons to undisclosed locations over the rail network.’ Recently, the ardor of the Reagan administration and the Senate for the Small ICBM has cooled considerably because of its high cost. Both, however, continue to support Peacekeeper rail garrison deployment, but key figures in the House support the Small ICBM and not the Peacekeeper. The resulting ”compromise,” as reflected in recent defense authorization bills, has resulted The authors wish to acknowledge thoughtful comments and criticism from John Allen, Gary Aubert, George Bing, Ashton Carter, Paul Chrzanowski, James Clarke, WilliamCrabtree, Sidney Drell, Albert Latter, Michael May, Joel Resnick, Allan Schaffer,Roger Speed, and John Toomay. Barry Fridling would like to acknowledge the support of a Social Science Research Council/ MacArthur Foundation Fellowship in International Peace and Security. Part of this work was performed under the auspices of the U.S.Department of Energy by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory under Contract No. W-7405-Eng-48. Barry E. Fridling performed this study while a research fellow in the Centerfor Science and International Afiairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, and a guest arms control intern at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. He is now a research staff member in the Science and Technology Division of the lnstitute for Defense Analyses. john R. Harvey is currently Deputy Program Leader for START and INF Verification at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Recently, he served as Project Manager for Advanced Strategic Missile Systems at Livermore where he directed systems studies addressing effectiveness, safety, and security issues associated with Small lCBM and assisted in evaluating alternative basing options for the MX ICBM. 1. “Memorandum for Correspondents,“ The White House, December 19,1986. The Peacekeeper is a three-stage, solid-propellant intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of accurately delivering ten independently targetable Mk21 reentry vehicles, each with a yield of several hundred kilotons, to a range of over 6,000 nautical miles. Fifty Peacekeeper ICBMs are currently being deployed in refurbished Minuteman 111silos located at the F.E. Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming. That deployment is scheduled to be completed by December 1988. International Security,Winter 1988/89(Vol. 13, No.3) 6 1988 by the Presidentand Fellows of Harvard College and of the MassachusettsInstitute of Technology. 113 International Security 13:3 I114 in partial funding for both programs but at a level insufficient to meet the goals of either. The purpose of this article is to evaluate the rail garrison basing option, to illustrate its strengths and weaknesses, and to provide recommendations. The rail garrison concept of operations as currently envisioned by the Air Force is described, and system response to strategic warning and system survivability-in-garrison as well as dispersed over the commercial rail network -are examined. We conclude that rail garrison basing is an unsatisfactory approachto deployment of additional Peacekeeper missiles, particularly because of concerns about system survivability. Modificationsthat increase survivability (e.g., routine rail mobility)would introducehard-to-solveproblems about the interface of the public with nuclear weapons systems. Increased funds for ICBM basing research and development (R&D)need to be appropriated at the earliest opportunity in order to provide the next administration with feasiblealternatives for Peacekeeper or alternateapproachesto retaining the viability of ICBMs. Background PresidentReagan‘s December 1986decision startedanother round in the long and sometimes agonizingnational debate over the future of the ICBM. Certain key questions have, over time, become increasingly interrelated: Does the nation need a survivableICBM?Are there sensible, politically expedient, and affordabletechnicaI solutions to achieve meaningfulsurvivability?What emphasis should be placed on improving the...