Clio Deceived: Patriotic Self-Censorship in Germany after the Great War

Clio Deceived Patriotic Self-censorship in Germany after the Great War Holger H. Herwig Joseph Fouche, a man for all seasons who served the Directory, Consulate, Empire, and Restoration as minister of police, was once reputed to have stated that any two lines from any oeuvre would suffice to have its author hanged. Indeed, the efforts of various Germans, both in official and private capacities, to undertake what John Rohl has termed ”patriotic self-censorship” with regard to the origins of the Great War reflect the sentiment expressed by the great French censor a century earlier.’ For nearly fifty years, until Fritz Fischer’s Griff nach der Weltrnacht appeared in 1961, which in many ways offered German readers the findings of the Italian author Luigi Albertini, the German interpretation of the origins of the First World War was dominated in large measure by the efforts of “patriotic self-censors,” and particularly by the historical writings of Alfred von Wegerer.2 Let me state at the outset that I accept the basic tenets of Fischer’s research -with the notable exceptions of the allegedly decisive ”war council” of December 8, 1912 and the so-called “bid for world power” in 1914. The Hamburg historian, assisted by a coterie of talented students, has convincingly documented that Vienna and Berlin opted for war in July 1914 in the belief that time was running out for both of them. In the case of AustriaI am indebted to Professors Werner T. Angress at the State University of New York at Stony Brook and Melvyn P. Leffler of the University of Virginia for their sage advice in the preparation of this article. Holger H. Herwig is Professor of History at Vunderbilt University. 1. John Rohl, ed., 2924: Delusion or Design? The testimony of two German diplomats (London: Elek, 1973),p. 37. The literature on this topic is truly immense-there are no fewer than 3,000 books extant on the events at Sarajevo in June 1914 alone. For two recent updates, see Ulrich Heinemann , Die uerdrangte Niederluge: Politische Offentlichkeit und Kriegsschuldfruge in der Weimarer Republik (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1983); and Wolfgang Jager, Historische Forschung und politische Kultur in Deutschland: Die Debutte 2914-2980 iiber den Ausbruch des Ersten Weltkrieges (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1984). 2. Fritz Fischer, Griff nuch der Weltmucht: Die Kriegszielpolitik des kaiserlichen Deutschland 1924/28 (Diisseldorf Droste, 1961); Luigi Albertini, The Origins of the War of 2924 (London: Oxford University Press, 1952-57), 3 vols. (Italian edition, Le origini dellu guerru del 2924 [Milan: Fratelli Bocca, 1942-431, 3 vols.); Alfred von Wegerer, Der Ausbruch des Weltkrieges 2924 (Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1939),2 vols. [nfernnfional Securify, Fall 1987(Vol. 12, No. 2) 01987by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 5 International Security 1 6 Hungary, only a military strike against Serbia could retard the centrifugal forces of nationalism within the Dual Monarchy; for Germany, only preventive war with Russia would allow the Reich to secure continental hegemony before the Russian "Great Program" of rearmament was completed by 1917. Statesmen and soldiers in both Vienna and Berlin in July 1914 assumed a "strike now better than later" mentality. In both capitals, they accepted the "calculated risk of a general European war in order to shore up-and, if at all possible, to expand-Otto von Bismarck's position of semi-hegemony in Europe. This article will trace the genesis and course of the officialcampaign in the Weimar Republic (and beyond) to counter Allied charges of German war guilt (Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles), and offer some suggestions concerningits impact upon subsequent German affairs. The inquiry will show that the German government as early as 1914, and especially during the period from November 1918 to June 1919, sought to "organize" materials in order to answer questions concerning the origins of the war. Further, it will show that from June 1919 through the Third Reich, key elements of the German bureaucracy mounted a massive and successful campaign of disinformation that purveyed false propaganda through a wide range of channels. These included the War Guilt Section (Kriegsschuldreferat)of the Foreign Ministry , which disseminated its official stance on war...