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The SDI and American R&D IAt the end of World War 11, there was a pent-up demand for civilian goods and services caused by a four-year hiatus while the economy was completely on a war footing. Not only was there a U.S. demand but also a worldwide demand because of extensive industrial devastation and even longer periods of wartime economy . Furthermore, the wartime developments in aviation, radar, automobiles , and various material sciences were directly applicable to the civilian economy and were adapted almost immediately. This history of technology transfer is often cited in justification of the application of research and development (R&D)resources to the Strategic Defense Initiative. However, the situation could hardly be more different today. The fundamental reason for not proceeding with a large-scale program is that the objectives are not well thought out and can probably not be met, certainly not in this millenium, and most llkely never. (Why, for example, Xray laser development is given a significant role in what is supposed to be a nonnuclear defense is beyond me.) There is a rule of thumb in industrial R&D that says if a project is within an order of magnitude of fruition, a pilot R&D program is justified. Most of these programs are several orders of magnitude away in precision and performance from reliable application in the hostile environment of outer space and are nowhere near ready for serious consideration in U.S. national security plans. A second reason is that even if we had a working system, it would not be accepted in our society. In the boost phase application, the heart of the program, it will be necessary to detect multiple targets, identify them as hostile, and execute the defensive action in a time that is short with respect to sixty seconds. This would mean turning over the decision on the probable future of civilization to a massive and untestable software program. I believe that a rational democratic society would reject the system once the choices were understood. A third question that should be faced is the probable cost. I have not seen an exact estimate yet, but there are some clues. In the past four years, we have spent a trillion dollars over and above normal operating expenditures Bernard O’Keefe is President of EGbG, lnc., of Wellesley, Mass. International Security, Fall 1986 (Vol. 11, No. 2) 01986by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 190 The SDl and American R&D I 191 to improve and expand our national defense system, and there are many who feel that we have gotten precious little improvement for our money. Can anyone believe that we can erect a three-dimensional shield for another trillion dollars? I would start the bidding at five trillion dollars, but I am sure that would be low. Assuming that we can wave some magic wand and overcome these fundamental objections, we still have the question of allocation of resources. Research on esoteric space-based programs is alluring and exciting. Very few commercial or industrial research projects give researchers the opportunity to work toward objectives far beyond the state of the art, for the straightforward reason that to get funding, there must be some prospect of payback in the foreseeable future. Even basic university research looks for some concrete objectives in the current generation of researchers. The prospects of working on a program that will last beyond a lifetime must be tempting to any researcher. Then there is the ”deep pockets” syndrome. Researchers, like trial lawyers, learn to go where the money is. Wrap these goodies in the American flag with just a touch of the Soviet menace, and you have tough competition for civilian research. If there were some reason to expect commercial benefits from these projects , they would be a little more palatable, but there is not. The possibilities of commercializing space with all our varied present technologies are well off in the future; it follows that commercializing space with technology that we do not have must indeed be remote. If we are to get any commercial benefits, it will have to be with earth-based applications. The space environment is a harsh one; very few...

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