A Strategy for the United States

I w h a t are the special circumstances of the process begun with the May-June 1978 UN General Assembly 's Special Sessions on Disarmament (SSOD), which differentiate it from other arms control and disarmament diplomacy? What can the United States and others try to accomplish by working in the unique environment of this global forum and in the "window" that the 1978 session may open up for progress leading to the next special meeting, probably in 1981? What follows rests on the assumption-which does not seem necessary to justify-that every opportunity which presents itself should be seized to stem and, if possible, reverse the steadily mounting worldwide buildup and costs of ever more lethal arms, both nuclear and conventional. This imperative is probably evident to the vast majority of human beings on the planet, even if most governments cannot-in the face of political rivalries, internal pressures and the military decisions of others-break the cycle of distrust that keeps three lively arms races ("strategic," "proliferation" and "conventional") going at the same time. But what Albert Einstein said still applies: We must never relax our efforts to arouse in the people of the world, and especially in their governments, an awareness of the unprecedented disaster which they are absolutely certain to bring on themselves unless there is a fundamental change in their attitudes toward one another as well as in their concept of the future. The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything except our way of thinking. What exactly is the process starting with the UN General Assembly's Special Session on Disarmament? The 1978 session will be brief-four or five weeks beginning May 23, 1978. At least two of those weeks will be devoted to general debate. It will be too brief for detailed consideration of new proposals. Indeed, much of its work is to be done in advance. But the SSOD can point to practical objectives, and set in motion a greatly improved process for attaining them. At worst, it could "decide" on impractical objectives, precluding a constructive follow-up. Lincoln Bloomfield is Professor of Political Science at the hlassachusetts Institute of Technology, where he has directed projects on the United Nations, arms control, and global interdependence. He served on the Presidential Commission on the 25th Anniversary of the U N , and on the Social Science Advisory Board of the U S . Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Harlan Cleveland is Director of the Program for Znternational Affairs of the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies. He was an Assistant Secretary of State and U S . Ambassador to N A T O in the 19605, and President of the University of Hawaii from 1969 to 1974. H e is also currently serving as Chairman of the US.WeatherModification Advisory Board. 32 A Strategy for the United States I 33 Many specific and constructive proposals for SSOD action have already been made by governmental and nongovernmental groups. But it is not a criticism of these proposals to recognize that some of them go back several decades to the periodic waves of international discussion about disarmament (as in the early 1960s), and have languished since. Some previous efforts would be pertinent: the September 1961McCloy-Zorin ”Joint Statement on Agreed Principles” stands the test of time extremely well, as a lucid description of what a serious disarmament process would entail-and as a clear definition of the chronic gap between American and Soviet thinking about what “verification“ ought to mean. An Open Moment? Conflict is endemic; some 70 substantial ones can be identified since World War 11, in addition to military coups and armed repressions. Right now there is relatively little international warfare, apart from chronic border fighting in the Middle East, South East Asia, and Africa. So it is a comparatively open moment for beginning a serious global discussion of disarmament. In the 33 years since the end of World War II-despite loud debates, long negotiations, and the universal espousal of general and complete disarmamentthe world has not even yet reached the beginning of arms reductions. Rising world military expenditures reached $334,000,000,000 a year in 1976. That is 8 percent more...