India's Nuclear and Space Programs: Intent and Policy

India‘s Nuclear and spac3ePrograrns: Intent and Pdicy Onkar Marwah India’s strategic weapons propensities have been the subject of much discussion. The nuclear explosion of May 18, 1974, tended to substantiate the assessments of those who saw an inevitable Indian nuclear bomb behind the country’s nuclear policies. The literature on the subject suggests that assessments of Indian intent, peaceful or otherwise, can be geared to contending rationales of morality, pragmatism, prestige, alternative cost-benefits, security, or deterrence.’ It is, therefore, useful to consider the effect of Indian nuclear and space decisions as serving both strategic and nonstrategic goals, whatever the judgment of intent. We can assume that the nuclear explosion of May 18, 1974 was India’s initial, formal, and public step toward the acquisition of a strategic weapons capability at some future date. By making such an assumption, certain portions of the 1. A substantial literature relating to these concerns exists, and may be organized under the rubric, ”India and the Bomb.” For arguments against an Indian acquisition of nuclear weapons, see: B. M. Kaushik, “India and the Bomb,” South Asian Studies (Rajasthan, India), 5 (l), January 1970, pp. 79-97; Peter King, “How Wide is a Nuclear Threshold? India and the Bomb,” Australian Outlook, 25 (2), For rationales in support of an Indian bomb, see: Raj Krishna, ”India and the Bomb,” India Quarterly, 21 (2), April-June 1965, pp. 119-37; Subramanian Swamy, “Objectives of India’s Strategic Defense,” Indian Economic Planning, An Alternative Approach, ed. S. Swamy (New Delhi: Vikas, 1971),pp. 85-103. For studies which emphasize the broader issues and inevitabilities, see: George H. Quester, The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973); Shelton L. Williams, The US.,India, and the Bomb (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1969). For analyses that detail India’s nuclear research and weapons potential, see: Sampooran Singh, India and the Nuclear Bomb (New Delhi: S. Chand, 1971); Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, The Near-Nuclear Countries and the NPT (Stockholm: SIPRI, 1974). For recently published material germane to the Indian bomb issue as part of a general concern with Nth country nuclear proliferation, arms control, or international system-management, see: Richard Rosecrance, ed., The Future of the International Strategic System (San Francisco: Chandler , 1972); Wayne Wilcox, Nuclear Weapons Options and the Strategic Environment in South Asia (Los Angeles: Southern California Arms Control and Foreign Policy Seminar, 1972); U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, India and japan: The Emerging Balance of Power in Asia and Opportunities for Arms Control, 1970-1975, ACDA/IR-170, prepared for the U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency by the Southern Asian/East Asian Institute of Columbia University. August 1971, pp. 198-212. The author wishes to acknowledge the help and support of the following in his research: Paul Doty and Albert Carnesale of Harvard University and Richard Rosecrance and George Quester of Cornell University. Onkar Marwah is a Research Fellow, Program for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University and is a Conflict in Znternational Relations Fellow of the Rockefeller Foundation. 96 I 97 India’s Nuclear lntent debate whether the country ”should-might-will-can” go nuclear, are simplified. It is further assumed that: I) packaging and fuse mechanisms distinguish a stockpile of fission explosives for peaceful purposes from a stockpile of nuclear bombs; 2) thermonuclear devices could be added to an Indian inventory of peaceful -purpose nuclear explosives and the endeavor justified economically as bigger blasts per unit of cost; 3) possible use or proclamation would determine whether explosivesof this nature were in Indian hands for peacefulor strategic ends. While intent may remain unclear, India’s potential strategic choices can be assessed within the following categories: -Technical and Managerial Decisions and Policies: These create the scientific capacity and administrative infrastructure for the production of peaceful nuclear explosives and/or nuclear weapons. -Financial and Economic Decisions and Policies:These relate to aggregate governmental expenditure patterns, and provide or deny investments in nuclear or space research within a system of 1) national priorities, and 2) opportunity -cost choices. -Political and Strategic Decisions and Policies: These arise as a function of the special nature of nuclear research whereby...