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  • Lincoln's Political Generals
  • Steven J. Ramold
Lincoln's Political Generals. By David Work. Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2009. ISBN: 978-0-2520-3445-9, 320 pp., cloth, $34.95.

The Civil War is filled with oxymorons (offensive defense, armed pacification, or, indeed, Civil War itself), but none generates as much immediate scorn as the political generals, the politicians who sought and/or accepted a commission [End Page 186] in the general ranks. Conventional wisdom holds that these generals did not have the experience or subsequent victories to justify their rank and therefore were burdens on the Army they sought to aid and support. Rather than patriots acting in the best interests of their country, the political generals seem shallow and self-serving, promoting their own agendas at the expense of the Union's security and safety. Because they were not professional soldiers and appeared more like self-important buffoons dallying at tasks they had no place performing, political generals became convenient scapegoats for Union failure. In fairness, however, a survey of West Point–educated officers provides a list of equally unsuccessful generals, like George McClellan and Ambrose Burnside. In a work that strives to redefine the image of at least some of the political generals, David Work takes a more detailed and open look at the phenomenon of "citizen generals," as the newly created generals liked to call themselves, and how they performed on the battlefield and in other spheres.

Political generals, as the author reveals, were not a new or unusual phenomenon. The Army had employed political generals in all of its previous wars with mixed success, and the reliance upon state-based militias to reinforce the standing Army in past wars created a clear connection between local politics and military service. It is perhaps worth comparing this situation to that of the U.S. Navy, a military force maintained by the national government and therefore spared the presence of political admirals. Because of the shortage of qualified officers to lead a rapidly expanding army, politicians who generated recruits and attracted political support in large demographic groups (especially important in the case of German- or Irish-born generals) became obvious candidates.

Work does a very credible job of selecting a cross-section of political generals for this study. His twelve specific choices were equally Republican and Democrat in their leanings, represented a cross-section of the country, and included both native and foreign-born examples and those regarded both as successes and failures on the battlefield. Starting with this representative sample, Work devotes several chronological chapters to various campaigns as a means of highlighting the activities of different political generals in different military situations. Some political generals fare poorly. Franz Sigel and Daniel Sickles, for example, performed poorly at critical times, and Work illuminates how instances such as these shaped the postwar view of citizen generals. Other political generals, however, defied the stereotype. The chapter on Vicksburg, [End Page 187] for example, vividly demonstrates the effectiveness of both Francis Blair and John Logan.

The most important part of Lincoln's Political Generals, however, is Work's redefinition of what political generals could and did achieve. By recognizing that they were politicians as well as generals, Work creates another means of judging the performance of his sample group. He underscores, for both good and ill, their assistance in shaping public opinion in their home states regarding the policies of Abraham Lincoln. Although political intrigue and personal gain often worked against Lincoln, political generals harnessed popular sentiment in support of their commander in chief, although the idea raises the obvious question of whether the political generals could have accomplished the same thing in their political roles only. In the manner of recent biographies, Work does not try to justify or defend the actions of his sample subjects, but merely to explain. In this, he does an excellent job. The book is clear in its intent, and the author soundly and logically presents his evidence in a manner that demonstrates his mastery of the subject. He forges the dual identity of political generals into a very readable form that explores both its military and political elements.

Steven J...

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