Not Yet A Garrison State: Reconsidering Eisenhower's Military-Industrial Complex

Dwight Eisenhower's farewell address continues to resonate, beyond this admirable special edition of Enterprise & Society. The term he employed to describe the influence of corporations and financial interests over national defense policy, the "military-industrial complex," usefully summarized phenomenon of his time. It also depicts an ongoing and arguably even structural phenomenon within contemporary American society. Ike would therefore appear in retrospect one part keen observer, another prophet. As the articles in this forum collectively suggest, the ideas embedded within his now-famous phrase continue to frame contemporary scholarship fifty years after his final Oval Office speech, though with a far narrower lens than Ike envisioned, and with less dire societal results than he feared. The military-industrial complex is both more real, and less frightening, than he foretold. At least, so far.¹

The term itself, "military-industrial complex," has fully entered the national lexicon in the ensuing five decades. It shapes punditry and public opinion, and even how academics conceive of their studies. Our forum authors have largely taken their charge to write on this topic as an opportunity to explore particular slices of an American economy shaped, served, and fundamentally altered by association with military spending. Theirs are microhistories, exploring local consequences of the Cold War.² Collectively they demonstrate the pervasiveness of the Cold War over all aspects of American society. Befitting this journal's interest our four papers largely addressed the national security state's impact on business, though similar far-reaching effects can easily be found within the nation's education system, transportation network, political environment, and overarching culture. They show that the military-industrial complex might be viewed as just another form of government stimulus, a politically-safe vote for military Keynesianism palatable to fiscal conservatives loath to support redistribution of wealth solely for domestic purposes. Though they admirably illuminate government's twentieth century reach, the four articles do not fully engage the broader philosophical aspect of Eisenhower's warning, specifically his fear that such politically palatable military spending threatened to erode the broad foundations of American liberty. Fortunately, Eisenhower proved better at identifying the problem of the growing military-industrial complex than in predicting its potential pitfalls, though each of these points, as well as the four papers in question, will be addressed below.

This forum shows the range of government's societal reach from the mid-twentieth century forward. For Eugene Gholz, the aviation industry stands as a case-study; for Mark Wilson, it is chemical and metal manufacturing; for Edmund Wherle, the interrelationship of employment and prosperity with military spending is the key, while for Jocelyn Wills it is high technology. Each has demonstrated the broad interconnection among interest, profit, and security that emerged to shape the American economy during World War II and after, largely demonstrating the state's impact on business. A broader definition also exists for understanding the military-industrial complex, however, one that explores not only the way it catalyzed and warped the American economy but also how actors engaged in military production, be they manufacturers, labor, or government, ultimately influenced national security policy not only for security's sake alone but also to maximize their own interests. This was Eisenhower's primary point and greatest fear, that American diplomacy and foreign affairs would fall prey to parochial or financial interests, and in turn that those unelected forces would prioritize their goals above the public good. "In the councils of government," he intoned, "we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex." Furthermore, "the potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist. We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes."³ In short, the establishment of segments of the economy permanently devoted to military production, a development he deemed unfortunate though necessary given the grave nature of the Soviet threat, threatened traditional American values because it created powerful interest groups capable of overriding the delicate balance of power ingrained within the American political system...