Central America and the United States

CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE UNITED STATES Constantine C. Menges E. Il Salvador, the little Central American nation offive million people, was given a name which in Spanish means "The Savior." That may be prophetic because the fate of 90 million people living in the seven nations stretching from Panama to the U.S. border will be profoundly affected by whether rightist repression, communist revolution, or moderate reform emerges from the current struggle. Success in El Salvador for the government ofreformist civilian and military groups currently under vicious attack by extremists ofthe left and right will greatly increase the prospects for social reform and political liberalization in the rest of Central America. Victory for the extreme left in El Salvador, on the other hand, would further polarize Guatemala and probably lead to a tragic increase in violence, sharply increasing the probability of communist victory there. That, in turn, would make it highly probable that communist and radical left groups, with clandestine help from Cuba and the revolutionary movements in Central America, would begin a campaign of destabilization through political action and terror directed against the governments of Mexico, Honduras, and perhaps even Panama. Whatever the ultimate outcome, the consequences ofmajor revolutionary violence and the counter-violence likely to be exercised by these threatened governments (especially Mexico) would include immense human suffering and severe economic dislocations resulting from disruptions in Mexican oil production and shipping through the Panama Canal. It is probable that large numbers of Mexican refugees seeking safety in the United States would swell the current tide ofillegal immiConstantine C. Menges has been associated with the Washington office ofthe Hudson Institute since 1978. He is also Director for International Political Risk Assessment with SAGE Associates and Editor of International Strategic Issues. 13 14 SAIS REVIEW gration by several millions if the violence approached the proportions experienced in El Salvador during 1980 (equivalent to 170,000 deaths in Mexico's population of 70 million). There would be billions ofdollars in direct economic and social costs for the United States merely to cope with the results ofthis revolutionary destabilization process—whether the revolutionary coalition gained power or not. There would be other large negative results. The continued success and expansion ofrevolutionary warfare in the Central America/Mexico region would distract, divide, and demoralize the United States, thereby making it less effective in other arenas such as Europe and the Persian Gulf where American leadership is important. For most citizens, the prospect of a radical—or worse, pro-Soviet Marxist—government in Mexico, whatever the deception used and despite initial pledges of "friendly relations," would appear to be a vital setback. Since power is "the capacity to achieve intended effects," the inability of the United States to prevent a political war on its doorstep would reduce the confidence of allies and others, such as Persian Gulfregimes, looking to the United States for protection. It is, of course, possible to dispute the perception that the momentum of revolutionary change will spread from one country in Central America to another and ultimately produce violence in Mexico. Nevertheless , the events of the last few years have clearly shown that the success of a revolutionary movement in one country stimulates the hopes ofsimilar ideological groups in neighboring countries and simultaneously raises fears among rightist groups that interact to increase polarization and extremist terror. That violent process then exacerbates economic problems and social inequalities, leading toward prerevolutionary conditions. In Central America and Mexico, the political and economic requirements of a sensible and balanced U.S. foreign policy are at present quite modest, while the consequences of misjudging the likelihood of widespread revolutionary violence could be enormous . After all, the United States has a 2,000-mile border with the last "domino," Mexico, and it is worth remembering that its severe poverty and social problems explain why millions of Mexican citizens have immigrated to the United States, both legally and illegally. Therefore, it is likely that some significant proportion of the U.S. Hispanic population would adopt a strongly favorable position toward revolutionary groups in Mexico which would promise, as in Central America today, to use violence in order to create more just and democratic institutions. That means there...