Rethinking U.S.-Israel Relations after the Lebanon War

RETHINKING U.S.-ISRAEL RELATIONS. AFTER THE LEBANON WAR Richard Falk J. here is a strange incoherence evident in recent discussions about U.S. relations with the state of Israel. On one side, Israeli foreign policy has been subjected to an unprecedented barrage of criticism centering on Israeli unreliability as an ally and on the country's expansionist goals. On the other side, the outcome of its most controversial undertaking, the 1982 invasion and occupation ofLebanon, has been openly celebrated by American leaders, creating, in Henry Kissinger's words, a situation in which "the possibilities for negotiation have never been better."1 Incoherence here, as often is the case, arises from the presence of inconsistent elements. It is generally true that American leaders resented the unilateral character of Israel's attack on Lebanon, and had apparently even used gentle diplomatic pressures in the months preceding June 1982 to discourage it. Similarly, Washington definitely seemed displeased by the defiant postures of Begin and Sharon, as well as by the fact that the United States was perceived as having been somewhat tainted by Israeli tactics in the war, including the widespread use of American-supplied cluster bombs in violation of congressional restrictions, the prolonged siege of Beirut, and subsequent Israeli complicity in the Shatila/Sabra massacres. At the same time, the U.S. government realized that the Israeli attack on Lebanon, and indeed the very extensiveness of it, produced enormous 1. New York Times, October 6, 1982. Richard Falk is Milbank Professor of International Law and Practice at Princeton University. His most recent books include Human Rights and State Sovereignty (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1981), and Indefensible Weapons, which he coauthored with Robert Jay Lifton (New York: Basic Books, 1982). Professor Falk acknowledges the editorial and research assistance of Cindy Halpern. 43 44 SAIS REVIEW benefits in relation to the wider goals of American foreign policy. Above all, Israel demonstrated that being an ally of the United States was far more beneficial than being allied with the Soviet Union, especially when it came to a range of combat circumstances. Israel's battlefield outperformance of Syria, and to a less impressive extent the plo, demonstrated the gaping technological disparities in the quality of the weaponry provided by the two superpowers. Presumably this message in America's favor is being interpreted by governments throughout the Middle East and beyond as a matter of the highest diplomatic and strategic priority. Furthermore, the American long-term resolve to contain radicalism in the Middle East was definitely bolstered by Israel's defeat and dispersal of the plo, which even now remains, alongside of Islamic fundamentalism, the main regional expression of radical nationalism. The Israeli victory also severely weakened the position and the capabilities of Lebanese radical elements , which were mainly Muslim and were closely allied with the plo. And not only were Palestinian nationalism and Lebanese domestic radicalism dealt heavy setbacks, but the war created a situation that enabled Israel to reshape decisively the Lebanese government under right-wing Christian auspices, assuring a Lebanese foreign policy and economic program oriented toward the West. As it happens, Lebanon's postwar leadership has indeed turned out to be anti-Palestinian and pro-American, without being at all willing to bestow upon Israel any economic or diplomatic rewards for its facilitative role. The new Lebanese leadership seems determined above all else to avoid taking the Sadat path, despite the extent to which their power derives from the heavy Israeli investment in the Phalangist cause since the 1975—76 civil war period and possibly before. Phalange hostility to a Palestinian presence within Lebanese boundaries is a definite contribution to Israeli security; that alone may be quite enough to validate the war effort in most Israeli eyes. As far as the United States goes, there have been no ambiguities or disappointments as regards postwar Lebanon, and the only wider concern involves Egypt's political future. Amin Gemayel has turned to Washington in the most unabashed fashion possible, asking for an expanded American military presence and offering the prospect of a secure "friend." Unlike Egypt at the time of Sadat's original peace initiative, Lebanon has no long history of bloody wars...