Pipeline Politics

PIPELINE POLITICS John P. Schutte, Jr. JO ew current discussions of Atlantic discord fail to mention the "Yamburg" Siberian gas pipeline, which will increase Western Europe's reliance on the Soviet Union for energy supplies. Europe's firm refusal to cancel or delay the pipeline at America's insistence provides the clearest symbol of what is wrong with the alliance today. To many Americans it seems as though their fickle allies have betrayed them for the sake of a quick buck. Europeans think that the United States is sticking its nose where it does not belong, that the pipeline is a European matter, to be evaluated only by the sovereign nations directly involved. From either perspective, mutual confidence has suffered. The issue became particularly troublesome after the December military crackdown in Poland. The Reagan administration urged that the project be sacrificed in order to punish the Soviet Union—the probable force behind Jaruzelski's military rule. Knowing that Europe would not willingly endanger the pipeline, the United States has unilaterally embargoed the export of American-made pipeline components. This assertion of American economic power appears to be directed at our intransigent allies as much as at the Soviet Union. It demonstrates an indifference toward European attitudes. Recently an unnamed White House official was reported to have said that "cooperation from European governments would be helpful, but . . . the United States might be able to force the European companies to comply [with the sanctions]."1 Such a view runs the risk of further alienating the already disenchanted allies, and is symptomatic of a U.S. policymaking pro1 . Dan Morgan, "U.S. Is Exploring New Ways to Halt Soviet Gas Line," Washington Post, January 31, 1982, p. 1. John P. Schutte, Jr., is a Ph.D. Candidate in European Studies at SAIS. 137 138 SAIS REVIEW cess that undertakes initiatives without allied consultation. As the Joint Economic Committee concluded on February 18, 1982: "Failure to coordinate in advance with the Europeans . . . aggravated the impression that U.S. leadership in East-West relations has been ineffective and haphazard." Furthermore , the public discord that resulted his been an embarrassment to all concerned. In recent months, however, the Reagan administration apparently has realized the perverse effect of its pipeline µ olicy. From the Ottawa summit in July 1981, until March of 1982, the administration repeatedly warned Europeans that the pipeline would be harmfa? to Western security. This view is echoed in the United States Congress, on the New York Times editorial page, and in a score of conservative journals. But the current downplaying of the issue indicates a belated understanding that U.S. cajoling and threatening of France and Germany was hurting the clliance more than the pipeline possibly could. Unfortunately, the damage ias already been done. The American preoccupation with the pipeline initially puzzled the Europeans , but gradually it began to irritate them. At first they did not understand what all the fuss was about. Energy trade with the Soviet Union is, after all, nothing new. Western Europe has been consuming Russian coal and oil for decades, even during the cold v/ar. Throughout the 1970s this trade flourished in the atmosphere of détente. From 1971 to 1979 Soviet oil exports grew from 33.8 to 54.8 million metric tons per year. In the same period, natural gas exports rose dramaticaly from 1.8 to 24.5 billion cubic meters (bcm) per year. Nor does the Yamburg pipeline involve a transfer of previously unavailable technology: Its 5,000 kilometers willjoin a Soviet gas trunkline system that doubled in size during the 1970s and covers a total of 130,000 kilometers. This includes some 10 000 kilometers used to deliver gas across frontiers.2 Many of these pipelines, particularly the large "Northern Lights" and Orenburg (or "Soyuz") lines, resulted from credit-pipe-gas deals similar to those arranged for the Yamburg project. For Europe, the United States' concern indicated a sudden shift in U.S. policy. For years, the United States had observed benignly the growing EastWest energy trade, and at one point even discussed purchasing Soviet liquid natural gas. Now President Reagan declares such trade to be dangerous. Aside from the harm such inconsistency...