Abstract

Abstract:

In this paper, I articulate the thesis that most delusional beliefs are continuous with other irrational beliefs. Any interpreter with some knowledge about the cognitive and affective life of subjects with delusions can at least partially understand their reports, and explain and predict their behavior in intentional terms. I identify similarities and differences between this approach to the nature of delusions and the approach adopted by Rhodes and Gipps, who have recently defended the view that people with delusions do not share the same bedrock beliefs as people without (the Background Theory of Delusions).

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Additional Information

ISSN
1086-3303
Print ISSN
1071-6076
Pages
pp. 77-87
Launched on MUSE
2011-06-02
Open Access
No
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