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286 SAIS REVIEW advocate a buildup of conventional capabilities, but not on too great a scale. They are in agreement in their analysis of the nature of deterrence, asserting that deterrence of war is enhanced by preparation to fight one. But they are not proponents of conventional retaliation; more specifically, they believe that a conventional attack on NATO can be deterred by powerful conventional forces ready to defend. While this perspective has much validity, the book suffers by not including other views of the requirements of conventional deterrence. Nevertheless, the essays are generally good, especially those dealing with the military balance in Europe. The editors, all army officers with extensive experience in Europe, have organized the book well. Conventional Deterrence will provide the interested observer with a good summary of factors involved in the equation of NATO security. Maritime Strategy or Coalition Defense. By Robert Komer. Baltimore: University Press of America, 1984. Revising U.S. Military Strategy. By Jeffrey Record. New York: Pergamon Press, 1984. Reviewed by William Hoffman, M.A. candidate, SAIS. Much ofthe present consternation over America's defense policy stems from the apparent paradox of increased defense outlays and heightened American vulnerability. This situation leads many observers to advocate changes in either our security posture, our defense budget process, or, more fundamentally, our foreign policy as a whole. Recent works by Robert Komer and Jeffrey Record address these issues, and while Komer propounds the merits of traditional U.S. security policy and describes the dangers of passively moving away from it, Record recommends some basic changes in the postwar orientation of American defense policy. In Revising U.S. Military Strategy, Record focuses on the imbalance between U.S. objectives and available resources. He divides his work into two parts: a historical examination of U.S. strategic doctrine explaining the origins of the present mismatch between ends and means, and a set of propositions for redressing the imbalance. Record believes the chasm between commitments and capabilities is wide and extremely perilous for U.S. national security. His proposals reflect what he feels to be the gravity of the situation. Komer, on the other hand, worries less about the ends-means dilemma than he does about the navy. In Maritime Strategy or Coalition Defense, Komer suggests that the idea of large gaps between forces and commitments stems not only from an inefficient, compromised planning process that produces an aggregation of "wish lists" that determine our military requirements, but also from real needs. The problems exist, he says, but we need not act rashly in order to control them. Komer considers "the reluctance of democracies to spend adequately on defense" a prime factor in our strategic dilemma. He believes the military balance is shifting: Today the Soviet Union "has caught up with and in some respects surpassed the United States." The relative decline in U.S. power, increased emphasis on conventional forces as a result of the nuclear stalemate, and the advent of new strategic requirements, particularly in the Persian Gulf, create a mismatch between strategy and resources in Komer's view. BOOK REVIEWS 287 Komer's cure for these ills is not novel. He proposes that the United States rely more heavily on its allies through greater burden-sharing and the more efficient allocation of resources. He perceives the United States to be dependent upon its coalition strategy. He follows the traditional tenets of MacKinder's "heartland" model rather than the precepts of Mahan's faith in maritime power. Komer sees in the Reagan administration's plans to develop a 600-ship navy the seeds of a dramatic shift to a naval strategy for U.S. security. Komer accomplishes his tasks of assaulting the potential results of such a move and of proving the virtues of a coalition strategy. Record makes opposite recommendations: the replacement of at least three U.S. divisions in Europe by allied units, U.S. concentration on defense of the Persian Gulf, a closer military involvement with China, efforts to weaken the loyalty of the Soviet Union's East European allies, a more aggressive military doctrine, increased reliance on reserve forces, and improved strategic mobility. Record presents his points skillfully and makes provocative arguments. However...

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