Jamaica: The Limits of a Showcase Policy

JAMAICA: THE LIMITS OF A SHOWCASE POLICY Scott D. Tollefson V.iOLENT protests rocked Jamaica for two days in January 1985 and shattered a four-year period of relative tranquility, evoking grim memories of the Dominican Republic uprising in April of the preceding year. The Kingston demonstrations, sparked by an increase of twenty-one percent in fuel prices, resulted in the death of at least seven people and the injury of twenty others, leading many observers to question the effectiveness of U.S. policy vis-à-vis Jamaica.1 That policy can only be analyzed in the broader context of U.S. policy in the Caribbean and Central America. The Reagan administration, in an attempt to halt perceived Soviet and Cuban influence in a region considered vital to U.S. national interests, has pursued an activist policy. President Reagan emphasized the strategic importance of the region three years ago: "Nearly halfof our trade, two-thirds ofour imported oil, and [more than] half of our imported strategic minerals pass through the Panama Canal or the Gulf of Mexico."2 The activist policy seeks to achieve U.S. political and strategic objectives through increased levels of economic and technical assistance. Although such an approach grants greater leverage to the United States, it may also create unrealistic expectations, stifle local initiative, increase the likelihood of U.S. intervention in the region, provoke nationalist reactions, and encourage leaders to "play the Cuba card." 1."Angry Island: A Violent Response to Austerity," Time, 28 January 1985, 53. 2.New York Times, 25 February 1982, A-14. Scott D. Tollefson is a Ph.D. candidate at SAIS. 189 190 SAIS REVIEW Furthermore, as Abraham Lowenthal notes, "to the extent that U.S. interest in the Caribbean appears to be merely expedient, not concerned with the region's people but rather only with potential threat to the United States, the chances increase that an active U.S. presence in the region will backfire."3 Given the limitations of an activist policy, three alternatives exist for U.S. foreign policymakers: traditional gunboat diplomacy, which is concerned only with strategic interests and does not address the social and economic source of regional conflicts; benign neglect or disengagement , which sees the region as irrelevant to U.S. national interests; and developmentalism, which seeks a sustained commitment to long-term economic development. A developmentalist strategy would be difficult to sustain and suffers from the inherent tension of promoting economic aid in areas such as Cuba that would not enjoy the confidence of investors. Similar to the activist strategy, a developmentalist policy also runs the risk of creating exaggerated expectations.4 As a centerpiece of its activist strategy, the Reagan administration singled out Jamaica to be a showcase of U.S. aid and development assistance. According to the Reagan administration, the United States has a long-term interest in the security and stability of Jamaica based on geographic proximity, trade and investment relationships, and a common commitment to democratic principles. By making Jamaica a showpiece , the United States "hoped to make Jamaica an example of what could be accomplished when assistance was provided to a government that shared the U.S. belief that private sector growth could lead to economic development."5 The showcase policy, however, has failed to embrace its intended developmentalist strategy, and has instead limited its goal of long-term economic growth by concentrating on political considerations. A strong Jamaican economy was supposed to moderate the pro-Cuban and proSoviet tendencies that surfaced in the 1970s and to serve as a buffer against leftist insurgency. Despite the Caribbean Basin Initiative (cbi) and large increases in bilateral and multilateral assistance, the showcase policy has been largely ineffective. Not only domestic and international economic conditions but also the constraining logic of an activist strategy have marred the "showcase". 3.Abraham F. Lowenthal, "The Insular Caribbean as a Crucial Test for U.S. Policy," in H. Michael Erisman (editor), The Caribbean Challenge: U.S. Policy in a Volatile Region, Boulder, Colorado; Westview Press (1984), 193-94. 4.Lowenthal, 192-95. 5.U.S. General Accounting Office, AID's Assistance toJamaica, GAO/ID 83-45, 19 April 1983, 1 . JAMAICA: THE LIMITS OF A...