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VIGILANCE AS METAPHOR: THE FOREIGN POLICY OF RONALD REAGAN Nancy Mitchell OREiGN policy is both action and metaphor. The most striking aspect of Ronald Reagan's foreign policy is its lack of overarching metaphor. This absence exposes his policy as a series of ad hoc actions; it has led some to doubt that he has a foreign policy strategy. We know that détente is dead. Détenteless, we have attempted to pour the new foreign policy into the old metaphors. America is, we are told, in the midst of the new cold war. However, this is inaccurate both factually and philosophically. Factually, the world, and particularly America's role in the world, has changed too much to be described by the dusty old images of decades ago. Philosophically, it goes against American nature to perceive events going backward to a replay of an old war: Our belief in linear progress is too strong. The fact that this label has not rooted in public consciousness exposes it for the desperate attempt it is to conceptualize U.S. foreign policy. "Desperate" is not an overstatement: We need a language to describe our reality. Without those words, we flounder about incoherently. It is not simply that we cannot describe the present; without metaphor we cannot understand the present or even envision the future. And as foreign policy encompasses no less than a nation's world view, only a metaphor can evoke all its ambiguity and complexity. Robert Frost has expressed eloquently the power of metaphor: Unless you are at home in the metaphor, unless you have had your proper poetical education in the metaphor, you are not safe anywhere. Nancy Mitchell is an M.A. candidate at SAIS. 133 134 SAIS REVIEW Because you are not at ease with figurative values you don't know how far you may expect to ride it and when it may break down with you. You are not safe in science; you are not safe in history.1 Consider the "domino theory," a metaphor that, like Helen's face, launched a thousand ships. It described, explained, and, in metaphor's furthest reach, even motivated action. Consider as well a weak metaphor: détente. Henry Kissinger overvalued this metaphor and rode it too far; it broke down with him. For a time the metaphor of détente elevated his and Richard Nixon's actions into a policy perceived by the public as coherent and active. However, its overextension led to a gradual clearing of what its detractors might call the metaphorical fog, and détente was rendered a collection of concessions, each one to be analyzed piecemeal, unprotected by its noble metaphorical frame. To this scrutiny Ronald Reagan has consigned his foreign policy. We analyze each crisis on its own merits; we cannot fit the constituent parts into an overall scheme because we have no words to describe them. At the abstract level we are mute. This silence is particularly damaging for an assessment of the foreign policy of Ronald Reagan, as his strength is precisely at this general level; his knowledge of particulars is almost universally derided. The most serious consequence of our inability to abstract from the specific issues is our inability to predict Reagan's future actions. Mixed signals are not unusual in the conduct of American foreign policy. But lacking a metaphor, we cannot evaluate and weigh these signals in the Reagan administration. For example, let us consider U.S. foreign policy in Central America. There is an uneasiness about Reagan's next step in Nicaragua: Will he invade? If we choose to give weight to the police action in Grenada and the shrill rhetoric, we are led to believe that invasion is likely. If we emphasize the handling of the crisis in Lebanon and the electioneering speeches of the new Reagan, however, we are led to believe that invasion is unlikely. Which are indicative of Reagan's foreign policy: signs of intervention or signs of caution? Reagan and his foreign policy staff have delivered speeches explaining their actions and philosophies, but these are of limited use. Long explanations are easily misinterpreted, contradicted, forgotten. Consider long explanations of the threat of communism in...

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