Correspondence

CORRESPONDENCE Margaret J. Berry, editor Authorization and Stabilization To the Editor: In his article, "The Rise and Decline of Military Authoritarianism in Latin America: The Role of Stabilization Policy" (SAIS Review 5:2, Summer-Fall 1985), Gordon Richards needlessly confuses the issue by focusing on the difference between civilian and military regimes. Rather than insist on differentiating between civilian and military regimes, we should focus instead on relative degrees of authoritarianism , or the attributes usually associated with military and civilian regimes. Like many other analysts, Richards attributes authoritarianism to military regimes and nonauthoritarianism to civilian regimes. He assumes that a change from civilian to military rule involves a shift to greater authoritarianism (and vice versa). This assumption, however, is illfounded ; it has been demonstrated time and again that regimes headed by civilians can rule via repression and authoritarianism just as effectively as the military. Witness the recent political histories of Haiti, Iran, the Philippines, Syria, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and all of the Eastern European countries. Richards argues, in short, that economic instability, in the form of rapid inflation and liquidity shortfalls, leads to the breakdown of civilian regimes. In the face of such economic crises, there is an "objective " need for stabilization. Civilian regimes, however, are often unwilling to pay the costs of stabilization, and economic problems then become chronic. This, in turn, delegitimizes the democratic process in the eyes of the military, which then overturns the democratic system. It is the lack of stabilization, then, that contributes to democratic breakdown. I would like to argue instead that, in the context of Latin American politics, it is more likely that the pursuit of stabilization leads to authoritarian rule, and further, that Richards's argument actually implies this is the case. A democratic regime may confront an economic crisis either by implementing traditional stabilization policies, or by choosing some other course. If it chooses a policy other than stabilization , as Richards correctly points out, the regime may well be overthrown by a more authoritarian regime which is committed to stabilization. It is useful, though, to consider the former scenario also, in which a democratic regime itself chooses to pursue stabilization. Richards does not directly 251 252 SAIS REVIEW address this scenario, and provides us only hints as to its political implications. If it chooses stabilization, a democratic regime must pay the costs to which Richards alludes. Unfortunately, he leaves these costs largely unspecified. In discussing the 1973-76 Peronist government in Argentina, Richards argues that although stabilization was required by existing circumstances, the regime proved "incapable or unwilling to enforce restriction in the face of labor union pressure." What exactly does this mean? In addressing this question, it must be remembered that stabilization represents an effort to constrict aggregate demand. In other words, money is being taken out of the hands of a great many people. Doing so has political implications, for people rarely make such sacrifices willingly. They protest , and, as a result, enforcing restrictions, in most contexts and certainly in Latin America, means that repressive techniques must be employed. In all but the strongest democracies stabilization is likely to be associated with authoritarian governance, regardless of whether the ruler is dressed as a civilian or officer. In short, faced with a need for stabilization, a democrat in Latin America can either 1) pay the costs of stabilization, that is, become an authoritarian himself, or 2) yield to an authoritarian. By focusing on the civilian/military distinction, however, Richards effectively examines only the second scenario. His own case of the Peronist government of the early 1970s, however, actually provides evidence of the first. The last twelve to eighteen months of Isabel Perón's rule were characterized by a renewed emphasis on stabilization and greatly heightened levels of repression. An even clearer example is provided by the earlier Argentine government of Arturo Frondizi (1958-62). Forced to pursue a rigid stabilization program, he ultimately ruled in a fashion more repressive than that of his predecessor General Aramburu. In sum, stabilization in Latin America appears to play a more important role in transforming less authoritarian into more authoritarian regimes, than it does in transforming civilian into military regimes. If this...