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178 SAIS Review SUMMER-FALL 1994 in this volume, irrespective ofrheir intrinsic value. The presence of rhe aforementioned chapter on the Russo-Japanese War is particularly perplexing, given rhatthat conflictwould seem to satisfy none ofthevague criteria for a Great Power small war, nor demonstrate any ofthe themes put forward. Indeed, the chapter is less concerned wirh the conduct ofthe war itselfthan with the long-term effects of the financial relationships rhat developed between the West and Japan during rhe war. Aldiough this is an appropriate and important analysis, the editors' assertion that it demonstrates the limits of Great Powet financial strength is strained and unconvincing. Even the rambling, incoherent concluding chapter cannot find a reason to mention the Russo-Japanese War. The chapters in general have such a diversity offocus and approach rhat the attempt ofdie framework chapters to package them into themes and to draw general conclusions or lessons fails dismally. The extent of this failure calls into question the entire exercise of trying to use historical case study to explain current political situations. As writers confront rhe unsettling confusion of the post-Cold War world, die use of historical analogy, both for descriptive and prescriptive purposes, has become pervasive. Unfortunately, such analyses often conceal more than they reveal in rheir attempts to mold the realities of today to rhe historical interpretation of yesterday. The current world situation does have many similarities to rhe pre-1914 days of imperial expansion, but it also has infinite differences. It would be methodological hubris to assert that our understanding ofany particular time period is sufficienrto allow us to isolate particular causative circumstances, and to even tentatively use the repetition of those circumstances for predictive purposes. This fact in no way diminishes the value of history as an illustrative tool. As several ofdie chapters in this book demonstrate, an historically based understanding ofthe world today is, within limits, both possible and desirable. History cannot give us answers, but it can give us greater wisdom when confronting today's problems. Circumstances do not recur, but issues do and the wisdom that history provides on these issues can inform rhe choices we make today. This, however, is a far cry from the analogical reasoning and deterministic use of history suggested by this volume. France and Germany, 1 983-1 993: The Struggle to Cooperate. Patrick McCarthy, editor. London, Great Britain: MacMillan Press, 1993. 212 pp. Hardback. Reviewed by Scott Carpenter. Mr. Carpenter received his BA from Hope College and is an MA candidate at SAIS. Alain Lamassoure, the French Minister for European Affairs, recently stated that if France and Germany were to take different sides on issues concerning Europe, BOOK REVIEWS 179 "there would be two Europes." Although Mr. Lamassoure made diis statement casually, he touched on the central reality oftoday's Europe. Thirty-one years ago, French President Charles de Gaulle and German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer signed the historic Elysée Treaty, ¿hereby ushering in a new era of FrancoCenrian cooperation. Aldiough the treaty did not herald the emergence ofan independent, French-led Europe, as de Gaulle no doubt intended, it did serve to foster close diplomatic and political ties between Paris and Bonn. Since diat time, the evolution of the European Community (EC), now European Union (EU), can largely be seen as the fruit, bitter or sweet, ofthis pivotal partnership. That said, the "partnership" which has formed the engine for European integration has been and remains uneasy, reflecting divergent views and fundamentally different priorities. Europe, for instance, has meant differentthings for bodi countries. For France, a French-led Europe represented the prospectofachieving its Gaullist goals ofindependence and grandeur. For Gemiany, Europe presented the means by which it could recapture its sovereignty and earn back rhe legitimacy it had squandered in two world wars. In the immediate post-War past, however, Germany resisted French pretensions to independence and leadership whenever it felt those pretensions undermined Europe's close ties with the United States. For its part, France insisted that Germany accept its leadership in return for granting Germany more sovereignty. In more recentyears, France has insisted on deeper European integration as the price to pay for German unification. The MaastrichtTreaty, signed in December 1991...

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