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TERRORISM: ITS POLITICAL USES AND ABUSES Gary G. Sick .ERRORISM, TO PARAPHRASE CLAUSEWITZ, is the continuation of politics by other means. The political content of the terrorist act distinguishes it from such ordinary criminal activities as murder, robbery, hijacking and extortion— all of which are committed with far greater frequency by vastly larger numbers of non-terrorists for motives of simple profit or passion. Terrorists become terrorists, at least initially, for reasons associated with politics. After a certain amount of time, of course, terrorists may continue to be terrorists for no reason except that they are terrorists. More than most vocations, terrorism does not easily lend itself to career changes. But the initial impulse that led a group to adopt terrorism as a method of operation or that persuaded an individual to participate in such activities almost certainly had its origins in political circumstances. Indeed, the political nature of their origin and proclaimed purpose is the most important common characteristic shared by such disparate groups as the Sendero Luminoso of Peru, the Provisional Irish Republican Army, the dissident Sikhs of India, the Moro National Liberation Front of the Philippines, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia, the Italian Red Brigades, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and in the United States, organizations as diverse as the Puerto Rican Front for National Liberation, the Weather Underground, the Jewish Defense League, and a scattering of neo-fascist groups. Gary G. Sick served on the National Security Council staff under presidents Ford, Carter, and Reagan. He was the principal White House aide for Iran during the Iranian Revolution and the hostage crisis and is the author of AIl Fall Down: America's Tragic Encounter with Iran. He is presently with the Ford Foundation, where he is responsible for programs relating to U.S. foreign policy. 11 12 SAIS REVIEW There are, ofcourse, other similarities among such groups, including many of the methods they employ, the organizational structures they adopt, and, some would argue, personality attributes. However, those similarities (to the extent they exist at all) do not adequately explain terrorism . Instead, they appear to be a by-product of the conditions and choices common to the terrorist experience. Individuals with a taste for violence and extremist beliefs may be attracted to terrorist activity, but such individuals exist in every population, including those that are relatively free of terrorism. Their choice of terrorism, as opposed to other possible forms of behavior, is a function of the political environment.1 The political nature of terrorism endows it with a special quality of generalized menace. Acts of violence against person or property for whatever reason may be terrifying, but when such acts are performed in conscious defiance of an existing political order and, as is often the case, in the pursuit of radical political alternatives, they acquire an added sinister weight. Terrorist acts may be directed at almost anyone, anywhere. The fact that such attacks are statistically rare is counterbalanced by the realization that, at least in principle, no one is entirely safe. Furthermore, the political underpinnings of the terrorist philosophy provide a convenient rationalization— perhaps even a perpetual incentive —to escalate both the frequency and the shock value of operations. Neither the calculus of the common criminal nor the constraints of conventional morality apply. Since terrorism occurs in an ethical netherworld where ordinary notions of good and bad, right and wrong, can be — and frequently are — reversed, the normal defense mechanisms of society seem less relevant and hence less comforting. Terrorists typically demand fundamental structural changes in the status quo (or the concessions that are politically humiliating) and seem to be willing to employ any means— however repugnant— to dramatize and advance their cause. They not only operate outside the law (which is common enough) but reject the ultimate legitimacy of the law itself. Terrorists attempt to rewrite the rules of the game and to transcend the barriers that societies erect for deterrence and self-protection. It is small consolation that they seldom succeed. The mere combination of outrageous demands and outrageous behavior commands our attention, in spite of ourselves. Terrorism is capable of inspiring a kind of horrified paralysis—like...

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