The Middle East Agenda

THE MIDDLE EAST AGENDA Robert E. Hunter E1 very new administration enters a strange world—a world that looks very different from the one portrayed in the campaign briefing books or defined in hectic and partisan political debate before election day. Within hours ofinauguration, a new leader becomes sole heir to all the power and problems of the American presidency, and confronts an unforgiving world that demands performance based not upon slogan or preconception, but upon adapting to and managing hard realities. At the same time, leaders of most nations of the world also understand the importance to themselves of the role America plays, and the need for a new administration to gain its bearings before it can chart a course that others can relate to in terms of their own interests. Abroad as at home, a new president is usually granted a honeymoon period during which he and his new team can prepare themselves for their awesome responsibilities. Even nations that do not wish America well, such as the Soviet Union, have traditionally recognized the need to give a new president some breathing space, not out of a sense ofmagnanimity but rather out of clearheaded recognition of the potential consequences of confronting an untried administration with challenges and problems to which it cannot yet react intelligently. But will President Reagan have the honeymoon period in world affairs that new administrations can usually count upon? That is very doubtful. In fact, it is hard to recall a transition from one American administration to the next that has posed so many demanding problems and uncertainties. To be sure, Presidents Eisenhower and Nixon both inherited wars in which the United States was deeply engaged, and where critical decisions had to be made shortly after the new team assumed office. Yet in both cases, the United States played a key role in RobertE.Hunterserved on the staffoftheNationalSecurity Council during the Carteradministration . He was responsible for West European affairs from 1977-79, and Middle East affairs from 1979-81. 47 48 SAIS REVIEW determining the pace of events; in both cases the accent was upon building on efforts to turn a long-continuing conflict in the direction of peace. This time, however, the course of several critical events abroad is less subject to U.S. decision. In fact, the course of some of these events is so uncertain that confident predictions cannot be made. And in at least one area, a complex set ofcircumstances will provide little room for reflection or deep understanding before the demands ofactually exercising power are thrust upon the Oval Office. This is the highly volatile, and highly critical, region of the Middle East. Until recently, U.S. interests and concerns in the Middle East centered on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Successive administrations sought to bring peace to a region beset by four wars between 1948 and 1973; they sought to preserve the security and integrity of Israel; they sought to limit and reduce the role of the Soviet Union in the region; and they sought where possible to preserve and extend good relations with various Arab states, while meeting the other, more fundamental, objectives . The Persian Gulf, meanwhile, was only a secondary consideration. To be sure, America's European and Japanese allies were increasing their dependence on oil from that region; and American oil companies— particularly the ARAMCO partnership offour great firms—had a massive commercial stake in the flow of oil at reasonable prices. But the United States took little ofthis oil directly. While oil was a commercial interest, it was of strategic importance only indirectly, through the needs of other oil-importing states whose economic health and vitality were critical to U.S. interests. And in any event, the leading nations on both sides of the Gulf—Iran and Saudi Arabia—had firm ties to the West. It was not surprising, therefore, that the Carter administration put its first Middle East emphasis on building on earlier efforts to bring stability—and, if possible, peace—to the Arab-Israeli conflict. However , this was also a discretionary act—if not in the commitment to pursue peace (after all, the United States had irrevocably involved itself in that effort following...