Waiting for Reagan

WAITING FOR REAGAN Simon Serfaty JLhe past four years have been years of few accomplishments, numerous miscalculations, and recurring crises in U.S. foreign policy. The Carter administration, because it lacked any structural consistency, made of its reversals a routine rarely seen in the recent past. Begun as a collégial administration that said aloud what it wanted to do, it soon ceased to say what it wanted as it lost control ofwhat it did. Never truly credible to the adversaries, the Carter foreign policies could neither gain any lasting support from the allies nor generate a firm consensus at home. In due time, to be sure, the Reagan administration will also be subjected to much criticism, as dissent is an avenue to power which observers will once more find irresistible to travel. Yet such criticism need not come with a reassessment of the failures of the outgoing administration. The initial Carter Grand Design, as stated at Notre Dame University in early 1977, and the improvisations and contradictions that characterized its implementation are well known. They were received at first with an indulgence that showed that the good intentions of the new president were well understood: a Year of transition, it was said after the first twelve months; a Year of adjustment; it was-hoped the following year; a Year of education, it was thought as we entered what was to be a long election year.1 Yet, already in 1977, confusion in style and an agitation in substance invited setbacks and crises. Although it is not unusual for a new president to want to assert an identity of his 'See for example my own essays on the administration, including: "A Quarter Before Carter," Proceedings, American Political Science Convention, Washington, D.C, September 1977; "Brzezinski : Play It Again, Zbig," Foreign Policy, 57 (Fall 1978), 3-21; and "Une politique étrangère introuvable," Politique Internationale, Winter 1979-1980, 178-192. Simon Serfaty is AssociateProfessor o/T/.S.ForeignPolicy atSAIS, and has served as Director ofthe School's Bologna Center and ofthe Washington Center ofForeign Policy Research. He is the author of numerous books and articles on Western European politics. 23 24 SAIS REVIEW own in foreign policy, the attempt was made this time with a determination and a thoroughness that had not been seen since the John Foster Dulles years, at least. Where the Nixon-Ford administration had reluctantly accepted the constraints imposed by the Congress and a public opinion still traumatized by the Vietnam war, the Carter administration appeared to welcome such constraints—constraints which several of its most influential members had helped initiate during their own years in the opposition. Indeed, there was much arrogance in the innumerable objectives that were specifically scheduled for completion during the first few months ofthe administration. Everywhere, success was promised quickly, including the adoption ofa zero-budget approach to the making of foreign policy and the juggling of the agenda that had been inherited from the previous administration. Carter, however, neglected to define his priorities. In January 1978, with failure thus written in the first year of transition—in spite (or because) of the ratification of the Panama treaty—the president was already promising to face "the world as it is." Accordingly, the new year was to be the Year of adjustment. In dealing with the Soviet Union, Notre Dame gave way first to Wake Forest, and next to Annapolis. Apparently dismissed earlier for being "not even a rival," Soviet military power was now acknowledged with a respect that invited empty threats. National security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski identified the new "maraudeurs" and their proxies in Africa and elsewhere in a growing "arc ofcrisis"—but what to do ifnot to show ever more patience and moderation: no B-Is, no Tridents, no cruise missiles, no neutron bombs, no MXs. Unable to deal with more than one issue at a time, the administration was making commendable efforts in the Middle East but—Camp David notwithstanding—at the expense of the impending disaster in Iran. It was focusing at last on southern Africa but it was neglecting the rising problems in North Africa and in the Horn. The most elementary contradictions were arising: how to seek...