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BOOK REVIEWS 187 furthermore a patent incongruity between Kennan's concern that too much government already exists and his desire to see diat government become more involved in the reduction ofAmerica's addictions. Another notable drawback is that he devotes relatively little attention to foreign policy. As in the domestic sphere, Kennan condemns die subordination of the national interest to the inordinate influence of parochial interests and lobbying groups. He also expresses a preference for a gradual, albeit ultimately thorough withdrawal of America's military presence abroad and a sizable reduction in current foreign aid. Kennan is as controversial in this wotk as ever and his cultured criticism warrants reflection. Even when his views appear so outdated as to be amusing, they invariably maintain a ring oftruth. In deriding a country that does not discourage its citizens from spending so much time watching television, he writes: "It is ... the custom ofthe media to purvey whatever it is they have to purvey in disconnected, staccato bursts or images, never inviting the viewer's or listener's attention to any one thought or proposition for more than a few moments, never asking or allowing time, for any comparison or analysis of contrasting or seemingly conflicting thoughts, and thus not only not stimulating and developing the capacity for sustained and thoughtful attention to any one subject, but positively debauching it." Kennan goes on to note that diis is now the case not only of television but also of cinema and even die press. At eighty-eight years of age, Kennan may offer criticisms that appear antiquated and even inconsistent at times. They are seldom, however, without merit. The Road to Power: The Trans-Siberian Railroad and the Colonization of Asian Russia, 1850-1917. By Steven G. Marks. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991. $32.95/Hatdcovet. Reviewed by AmaruL· J. Bichsel. Ms. Bichsel holds a BA from Bowdoin College and is an MA candite at SAIS. Most would agree that the Trans-Siberian railroad, which became the focus of Russia's attempt to modernize in die 1880s, was a failure on a grand scale, but scholars tend to diffet in dieir characterization ofdie impetus for its construction—and therefore the nature ofthe failure. In The Road ? Power, Steven Marks argues diat the motivating force behind the building ofthe transcontinental railroad from Moscow to Vladivostok was political. This contradicts (ot at least qualifies) the theses of many other economic historians who contend that, as politically driven as die project might have appeared, the underlying concerns were fundamentally economic. The latter view was both more accessible to Western scholars, who were able to draw on America's railroad experience, and more appealing to the Soviets, whose Marxist 188 SAIS Review WINTER-SPRING 1994 determinism fit nicely into this framewotk. In this way, Marks' emphasis on die political aspects certainly fills a gap in the scholarly literature. And as the current debate between President Boris Yeltsin and the oudying regions of Russia intensifies, die history of the tenuous relationship between Moscow and Siberia becomes even more instructive. Marks' thesis is ambitious. He has set out to re-assess the performance ofboth die state (meaning the Tsar) and Serge Witte, the Minister ofFinance, in modernizing Russia. In Marks' opinion, Witte's main concerns, despite the progressive facade of his policies, were securing and strengthening die realm, preserving the autocratic system and bringing glory to the monarchy. Witte saw die completion ofdie railroad as his most important task upon taking office, not only to serve the state's obvious political needs but also to impress Europe with Russia's ability. This was more psychological man anything else; there was a greater need for Russia to compensate for a perceived inadequacy than to acquire new markets. A desire for prominence was the engine behind the idea that a new international center, a bridge between East and West would be in Moscow. Marks observes that Russia lay at a distinct disadvantage in the East; its "colonial settlements" were negligible compared to die millions-strong, compact populations of China and Japan. There was also a trade imbalance. In the late 1880s, the total volume of imports through Vladivostok was twice that...

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