In the Arena: A Memoir of Victory, Defeat, and Renewal (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 171 Trilateral Commission, has been disregarded or ignored in past analyses of international relations. Yet Nau's thesis is problematic in several areas. The first has to do with the degree to which this concept corresponds to the world of economics and politics today. The assertion that markets are more important than institutions is plausible, but the current round of GATT negotiations, the new European Community regulations and the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement all indicate something else. The second problem lies in Nau's argumentation. If the role of non-bargaining, competitive mechanisms of policy influence, such as international markets, were more important than institutional mechanisms of change, why is it necessary that choices of national policy be made on the basis of ideas generated in the "cocoon"? Wouldn't it be more logical for this cocoon of consensus-building to dominate in a world where the institutional mechanisms of change have priority? By contrast, in a world where international markets, by their own rules of economic efficiency, open competition , and profits, play a preeminent role, it is difficult to see room for quasigovernmental or real governmental intervention. In the final chapter of the book, Nau uses these three basic concepts to analyze the United States' international role, and the so-called "decline" of its power. Although it is difficult to accept all of Nau's assumptions, it is easy to agree with his point that U.S. leadership was critical to the evolution ofthe open, efficient postwar economic system; the U.S. bore the costs ofthe liberal order and supplied a purpose for that order. From this perspective then, Nau's argument that "America's decline is a myth" becomes plausible. He maintains that so long as the U.S. continues to provide the international order with a purpose, it does not need as much power and therefore the issue of decline is not as relevant as most people today think. The problem with this analysis is this: American power is needed precisely to assure that the U.S. vision ofthe international order continue to be maintained. I would posit different (i.e., structuralist) arguments and methodologies for looking at the U.S. role in the postwar period. I would argue that the United States is indeed in decline. However, it is still the leading world power and it alone possesses the best combination of economic, political and military power and prestige to forward its vision of the world. The fact that Henry Nau's book arrives at this same point using its own original methodology is its biggest strength. Henry Nau's book contributes a great deal to current discussions of American and international political economy. In the Arena: A Memoir of Victory, Defeat, and Renewal. By Richard Nixon. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990. 384pp. Reviewed by Bill S. Mikhail, Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Government and Foreign Policy, University of Virginia. "Peace at the center," a Quaker adage which Richard Nixon learned in his childhood, is described as the moral basis of Nixon's life and his political career. 172 SAIS REVIEW This new book by the former President provides a panoramic view of topics ranging from political discussions on issues such as war, peace, geopolitics, pragmatism and governance, to reflections on more personal themes such as family, religion, and his own reflection process. The book provides interesting and intelligent political commentary as well as insight into Nixon's life. Nixon sees his political comeback as representative of what the British historian Arnold Toynbee has called "the phenomenon ofwithdrawal and return." The disgrace of Watergate has been overshadowed by Nixon's assumption of the role of world statesman, and his public observations, analyses and writings on international relations and global changes. Nixon argues that political leadership reflects the quality of political appointments. Great leaders like DeGaulle, Adenauer and Yoshida enhanced their status and expertise in foreign policy with the assistance of experts like Pompidou, Erhardt, and Ikeda. This rationale helps to explain Nixon's choice of Henry Kissinger as his national security adviser despite the latter's previous support for Nixon rival Nelson Rockefeller. Nixon believes, however, that the primary weakness of...