Command of the Seas (review)

264 SAISREVIEW sum, establishing relations with Hanoi or even giving it assistance will not split it from the Soviet Union. On the contrary, taking pressure off the Vietnamese Communists may actually diminish the growing tension between Moscow and Hanoi. It is also clear that establishing relations with the Hanoi regime will not resolve the issue of the POW-MLAs. First, LeBoutillier's assertion that there are still Americans held against their will by the Vietnamese or Laotian authorities is highly questionable. It is more likely that Hanoi and its clients killed all their remaining American prisoners sometime in the late 1970s to avoid the repercussions had such prisoners been discovered. It is true, however, that the SRV has tried to use the POW-MLA issue as a ghoulish tool to pressure the United States for recognition and economic aid. But the implication here is that the United States should take even a firmer stand on the issue of recognition: Washington should insist that the Vietnamese Communist authorities be completely forthright on the POW-MIA issue before the United States will grant them diplomatic recognition. The same goes for other humanitarian concerns such as South Vietnamese political prisoners and Vietnamese emigration policy: the United States should make clear to Hanoi that recognition is not possible until Vietnam releases all political prisoners, allows them to go to the West, and loosens its overall emigration policy. Establishing relations with the Vietnamese regime immediately and without preconditions, as LeBoutillier argues, will actually lower incentives for the Vietnamese to make progress on these issues, thus making their resolution more difficult. In sum, LeBoutillier's Vietnam Now, while interesting reading, presents weak arguments for establishing official relations with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. While the United States may eventually decide to recognize the Hanoi regime, this decision should be based on whether or not such an action will serve American interests. For the time being, a policy of non-recognition and isolation ofVietnam better serves American interests by creating tension between Vietnam and the Soviet Union and pressuring the Hanoi regime to resolve humanitarian issues. Command ofthe Seas. By John F. Lehman, Jr. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1989. 464 pp. $21.95/hardcover. Reviewed by Brian Ross, M.A. candidate, SAIS. Command ofthe Seas, former Navy Secretary John Lehman's ode to naval power, is only a year old, but the reader can't help but wonder if it is a relic of another age. Subtitled Building the 600 Ship Navy, the book is mainly a chronicle of the why and how behind the maritime side of Ronald Reagan's defense buildup. Lehman makes a convincing case for the necessity of revamping and expanding the Navy and Marine Corps (also under his jurisdiction) in 1981, but in 1990 two questions inevitably arise: Does the rationale for the 600 ship navy still exist? If so, is the political will still there to implement it? The former is debatable, but BOOK REVIEWS 265 the answer to the latter is certainly negative. In fact, the navy never quite reached Lehman's objective, peaking just under it in 1989 before declining to its present level of around 550 ships. While the Navy and Marine Corps may enjoy somewhat more immunity than the Army from the present mood on Capitol Hill, further force reductions are certainly in the cards. Novices will find the parts of Lehman's book dealing with the nuts and bolts of building naval and marine forces tough going, but the majority of Command of the Seas deals with more interesting topics: Lehman's battles with the Pentagon, Capitol Hill, and the navy bureaucracy, an examination of naval operations during Lehman's term (Lebanon, Grenada and the Persian Gulf, as well as the Falklands War), and Lehman's conclusions and recommendations for the future. The opening chapter, on the death-struggle between Lehman and Admiral Hyman Rickover for control of the navy, is particularly interesting. Secretary Lehman came into office with the primary goal of forcing the strongly entrenched Rickover into retirement, and Rickover fought him tooth and nail. Lehman's insider account of how top administration and military officials play hardball is of interest to...