Vietnam Now: A Case for Normalizing Relations with Hanoi (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 263 Vietnam Now: A Case for Normalizing Relations with Hanoi. By John LeBoutillier. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1989. 115 pp. Reviewed by Raphael Cung, M.A. Candidate, SAIS. The Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) is one of a handful of countries with which the United States has refused to establish diplomatic or commercial relations. The United States shelved its plan to recognize Vietnam after the Vietnamese invaded Cambodia in late 1978. However, with the apparent withdrawal ofVietnamese troops from Cambodia in September 1989, many have called for the Bush Administration to officially recognize the Hanoi regime. Vietnam Now, by John LeBoutillier, is the latest work calling for the United States to establish official relations with Vietnam and eventually to offer the Hanoi regime economic assistance. The first and major part of LeBoutillier's book contains his pseudo-geopolitical arguments for establishing such relations. The second part concerns American prisoners-of-war and missing-in-action personnel (POW-MIAs) supposedly still held against their will in Indochina. Finally, LeBoutillier criticizes how American policy toward Vietnam is formulated. The first and second parts of Vietnam Now are the most interesting. LeBoutillier argues that recognizing Hanoi will serve several American interests. First, establishing relations will drive a wedge between the SRV and its patron, the Soviet Union, thus decreasing Soviet influence in Southeast Asia. This is especially possible because Vietnam supposedly wants to be independent of the Soviet Union. Moreover, a concomitant benefit will be a resurgence of American influence in the region. LeBoutillier also argues that since there are, in fact, still American POW-MIAs held against their will in Indochina, recognizing and giving economic aid to the SRV will induce the Vietnamese regime to free these men (most of whom are supposedly under the control ofVietnam's clients, the Laotian Communists). LeBoutillier's arguments, while plausible on the surface, are extremely weak because they rest on invalid assumptions. First, the Vietnamese Communist regime (which is second only to Cuba in receiving Soviet aid) cannot in fact be independent of its Soviet master, since it depends to large extent on Soviet economic and military assistance to stay in power. Second, recent history has shown that a policy of pressure—rather than one of concessions—works better in bringing about desired Vietnamese actions. Cambodia is a case in point: an important factor contributing to the Vietnamese withdrawal was no doubt the West's diplomatic ostracism and economic isolation of Hanoi. In fact, a policy of pressure may also bring about a wedge—or at least friction—between Vietnam and the Soviet Union: continuing to pressure Hanoi will cause it to make excessive demands that Moscow cannot meet, which may then lead to disillusionment and tension between master and servant. Recent developments suggest that this process may have already started. The Soviet Union has reportedly cut drastically its economic assistance to Hanoi, and will probably withdraw some of its air and naval forces from bases in Vietnam. No doubt these actions are due in part to the Soviet leadership's disenchantment with the demands of its corrupt and embarrassing client. In 264 SAISREVIEW sum, establishing relations with Hanoi or even giving it assistance will not split it from the Soviet Union. On the contrary, taking pressure off the Vietnamese Communists may actually diminish the growing tension between Moscow and Hanoi. It is also clear that establishing relations with the Hanoi regime will not resolve the issue of the POW-MIAs. First, LeBoutillier's assertion that there are still Americans held against their will by the Vietnamese or Laotian authorities is highly questionable. It is more likely that Hanoi and its clients killed all their remaining American prisoners sometime in the late 1970s to avoid the repercussions had such prisoners been discovered. It is true, however, that the SRV has tried to use the POW-MLA issue as a ghoulish tool to pressure the United States for recognition and economic aid. But the implication here is that the United States should take even a firmer stand on the issue of recognition: Washington should insist that the Vietnamese Communist authorities be completely forthright on the POW-MIA issue before the United States will grant...