The Prospects for Peace in El Salvador

THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE. IN EL SALVADOR Gary Bland Neither the government, the ARENA party, the opposition, nor the social forces, even if they all join together, has sufficient power to overcome the military veto on questions that the Armed Forces considers to effect deeply its interests, unless they can count on the firm and explicit support of the United States.1 Ignacio Ellacuría, March 1989 T,he late Father Ellacuría, one of the six Jesuit priests murdered by members of the armed forces last November, was highly respected for forcefully conveying the reality of the civil war in El Salvador. His point was simple: the nearly ten-year-old war was stalemated and the only way to overcome the army's refusal to negotiate was to secure the active support of the United States for a political settlement. The power ofthe armed forces—its ability to block peaceful social and economic change—has been a fact oflife in El Salvador for many decades. But since 1980, by bankrolling the multi-billion dollar counterinsurgency war, the United States has acquired the leverage to influence substan1 . Ignacio Ellacuría, "Una Nueva Fase En El Proceso Salvadoreño,"i£sí«<¿íos Centroamericanos, año XLIV, no. 485 (March 1989): 189. Gary Bland is a recent graduate ofSAIS (M.A., May 1990). He conducted much of the research for this article while in El Salvador on an Andrew W. Mellon Fellowship. 191 192 SAISREVIEW tially military decision making. While there is no guarantee that U.S. pressure in support of negotiations can end the war, the failure to seek dialogue has fueled the conflict. By providing massive amounts of aid in pursuit ofmilitary victory and failing to foster social and economic reform, Washington has reinforced the armed forces's predominant role in Salvadoran society. The explosion of violence during the final months of 1989 may have been averted had the Bush administration forcefully responded to the important changes that occurred throughout the year. Evidence indicated that El Salvador's new president, inaugurated on June 1, personally desired a political settlement. The Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) rebels, having radically shifted their position over the course ofthe year, had also displayed a genuine desire to negotiate an end to the war. And international pressures were moving both sides toward dialogue. After a series of indirect contacts beginning in mid-summer of 1989, President Alfredo Cristiani's dialogue commission and a high-ranking FMLN delegation met for preliminary talks in mid-September. The outcome was surprisingly favorable: both sides agreed to meet monthly and not withdraw from the process until a final accord was reached. The second meeting in October, however, the first to include discussions on substantive proposals, demonstrated how far apart the two sides were. Costa Rican President Oscar Arias was able to keep the two sides together long enough to agree on a third round for mid-November. A wave of right-wing violence soon ensued, particularly a bombing that killed ten people at a leftist labor confederation. The FMLN withdrew from the dialogue process in protest. Believing that attempts to negotiate were futile, the rebels launched a major offensive on November 11 in an effort to increase pressure on the government and win respect for their moves toward reconciliation. As the talks proceeded it became clear that President Cristiani, like his predecessor, José Napoleón Duarte, was too weak to control the farright members of his party and the military, both of whom are violently opposed to compromise and committed to undermining negotiations. The Bush White House, in effect extending the Reagan administration's policy, showed no commitment to the talks and thus failed to provide Cristiani with the backing he needed to pursue negotiations seriously. Equally important, Washington's lack of strong support for the dialogue process weakened the position of those elements on the left which, despite the right-wing violence, opposed the November rebel offensive. The offensive placed the reality of El Salvador—the limited power of the president, the military strength ofthe rebels, and the strong influence of the United States—in sharp relief. After the fiercest fighting in a decade, however, both President Cristiani and the FMLN showed a PEACEINELSALVADOR 193 willingness to return to the negotiating table with surprising speed. And their efforts may be aided by one tremendously important change. Since the offensive, the Bush administration has moderated its position: It has clearly stated that a negotiated settlement is the only way to end the war and hinted at the need for leverage to pursue such a settlement. A review of the forces that were responsible for producing the first substantive dialogue ofthe decade-long war is essential to an understanding of the prospects for peace in the wake of the FMLN offensive. Those forces—a major shift in the FMLN's approach, a Salvadoran president who wants a political settlement, favorable international pressures, and a pragmatic U.S. administration—are present today. Their combined impact appears to be pushing both sides toward the negotiating table. But what happens when they get there will be largely determined by how strongly the U.S. backs a negotiated settlement. A Major Shift by the FMLN On January 23, 1989, with the Duarte era approaching its end, the Bush administration settling into office, and El Salvador's presidential elections less than two months away, the FMLN announced a landmark proposal for ending the war. The FMLN, which had repeatedly labeled the U.S.-sponsored electoral process a farce and had attempted to disrupt it by force, suddenly offered to participate in the upcoming election provided several conditions were met, including a six-month delay in the vote. In accepting the legitimacy of elections, the proposal represented a major shift in the rebels' approach and it quickly dominated the national debate in El Salvador. President Duarte, after receiving signals from the Bush administration that the plan was worthy of consideration, showed flexibility toward it. An unprecedented flurry of political jockeying ensued, producing what many believed was the best opportunity for peace since the start of the war. In the process, it became clear that the FMLN had dropped two longstanding demands: a period of transitional "powersharing " between the two sides and integration ofthe rebel army into the Salvadoran military. Weeks before election day, however, both sides recognized that postponement ofthe election was not a serious possibility. The significance of these events was twofold. First, the FMLN was hailed at home and abroad for exhibiting a new moderation. With gestures of conciliation and another proposal that outlined conditions for ending the war, the rebels placed themselves at the center ofthe national debate for weeks. They set the agenda, forcing the United States, the Duarte government, and all political parties to respond or else risk 194 SAISREVIEW appearing intransigent. At home and abroad, peace in El Salvador was now widely viewed as a powerful political issue and, for having taken the initiative, the FMLN was accorded renewed legitimacy. Second, the FMLN demonstrated that its new approach represented a permanent shift. As a leading rebel diplomat stated after the peace effort failed—"We aren't going to take back everything we have said just because our proposal wasn't accepted."2 Each of the six proposals made by the FMLN in 1989 appeared to accept elections as a means of gaining power, provided certain conditions could be agreed upon to ensure that the vote would be truly "democratic." Some of the proposed conditions were reasonable. Others reflected a hard line toward talks. But the key concessions, particularly the acceptance ofdemocratic elections, remained constant. The January 1989 peace proposal was the culmination of a radical reassessment by the rebels of their long-range goals. Beginning at a major strategy session in May 1988, the FMLN sought to respond to the fundamental changes that had occurred in the political climate at home and abroad.3 In formulating a new strategy, the FMLN decided to send a delegation to tour Western Europe and Latin America in the fall. For the rebels, who had not left the mountains in years, the response they received on the tour was a rude awakening: pursue a negotiated settlement—not military victory. Mexico, whose views the FMLN respects and which in 1981 joined with France in recognizing the rebels as a "representative political force," unexpectedly criticized them.4 The FMLN's self-examination reportedly included a realistic view ofthe war: it was stalemated and its social and economic costs to the country were great. Even if victorious, the rebels could, as in Nicaragua, expect to face U.S. hostility and, given the changes under Mikhail Gorbachev, could not count on support from the Soviet Union. The Soviets had reportedly informed the FMLN that since they could not underwrite another revolutionary regime, it should pursue negotiations with the aim ofsecuring support from the West.5 Changes in El Salvador, particularly the increased tolerance shown for their political allies and a free press, influenced the rebels' analysis. Finally, there was the progress of the 2.Washington Post, March 5, 1989, A30. 3.Ellacuría, "Una Nueva Fase en El Proceso Salvadoreño," 175. 4.Frank Smythe, "Negotiations or Total War," The Nation, (August 7-14, 1989), 164; and Daniel Levy and Gabriel Szekeley, Mexico: Paradoxes ofStability and Change (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1987), 196. During their Latin American tour, the FMLN reportedly visited Argentina, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and Uruguay. 5.Washington Post, January 24, 1989, A15. PEACE IN EL SALVADOR 195 Central American peace plan, the election ofa pragmatic U.S. administration , and the deep desire for peace among Salvadorans. All ofthese were reportedly important considerations in the FMLN's reassessment.6 The FMLN now sought, according to its senior leader, Joaquin Villalobos, "an El Salvador that is open, flexible, pluralistic, and democratic in both the economic and political spheres."7 Villalobos also asserted that the rebels were not dogmatic socialists but were demanding resolution of the country's social problems within a Western-style democracy. Accordingly, the FMLN decided to abandon the "prolonged popular war" approach and to seek compromise in an effort to achieve a political settlement, including peaceful coexistence with the United States. The new FMLN position should be qualified on two points. First, events from last year indicate that there are opposing tendencies within the rebel movement. For example, after the rebel assassination of the attorney general in April, Villalobos was reportedly furious with the FMLN group that carried it out. While two of the five groups that make up the FMLN maintained their right to use such tactics, assassinations of civilians were by late summer apparently halted on the grounds that they were politically counterproductive. Villalobos' visible role in the rebel peace offensive throughout 1989 is viewed as significant. The rebel group he leads reportedly can be ruthless in its tactics, but it is nevertheless politically pragmatic and the most flexible regarding talks with the government.8 Second, to prevent the enemy from viewing its concessions as a sign of weakness, the FMLN consistently used military force to bolster its appeals for serious negotiations. For example, the FMLN stepped up the fighting prior to its diplomatic offensive in January 1989. The rebels threatened to make the country ungovernable iftheir peace proposal was rejected. And immediately after the second round of dialogue, for which the rebels had called a ten-day unilateral truce, they launched a series of strong attacks in the wake of perceived government intransigence. By mid-summer 1989, however, the FMLN decided to use more carrot than stick in its dual-track approach to a political settlement. At that time, El Salvador's major opposition parties were serving as intermediaries in an effort to bring the government and the rebels to the negotiating table. The FMLN reacted positively to the parties' reports that President 6.Ellacuría, "Una Nueva Fase en El Proceso Salvadoreño," 175-81. 7.Joaquín Villalobos, "A Democratic Revolution For El Salvador," Foreign Policy, no. 74 (Spring 1989): 120-21. 8.Frank Smythe, "Stark Choice In El Salvador: Negotiations or Total War," The Nation (August 7-14, 1989), 164-65; an interview conducted with a leading party member in August 1989; and Washington Post, February 27, 1990, A17. 196 SAISREVIEW Cristiani was serious about forming a government commission to begin a permanent dialogue. Consequently, showing a strong willingness to be flexible, the five top rebel leaders sent a letter to Cristiani telling him that a few points in his plan for a dialogue commission were "inconvenient ."9 In contrast, just two months earlier, the FMLN had declared that Cristiani's idea for a dialogue commission was an "offer to surrender."10 Cristiani, however, could not come to agreement on naming a new commission due to strong opposition from the right wing, which was insisting on a number of conditions for talks. The president's first commission plan had failed, and the second was on the verge of collapse. The rebels, as if to help the president surmount his political difficulties, subsequently announced they would accept "virtually all" of the government 's conditions and called for talks to begin the following week.11 A week later, the dialogue began. President Cristiani Supports a Political Settlement The victory ofAlfredo Cristiani in the 1989 presidential election gave ARENA, the right-wing party formed out ofthe paramilitary death squads of the early 1980s, control of all three branches of the Salvadoran government. It was feared that the government would reject any hint of serious negotiations and push for "total war" aimed at out wiping out the rebels and their sympathizers. Cristiani was expected to serve as the front-man for the right wing's human rights atrocities. To an extent these predictions proved accurate. With regard to negotiations, however, the events leading from Cristiani's inauguration to the November FMLN offensive demonstrated that the president wanted the dialogue process to succeed. He strongly expressed his support for a political settlement, angered the far Right by pursuing negotiations, and even convinced the FMLN that his desire to achieve peace was sincere. The problem, once again, was the severely limited power of the civilian president. The Cristiani government appeared semi-detached from the ARENA party's hardliners, partially because ofthe Bush administration's efforts to pull the president away from them. Cristiani and his close supporters 9.Letter of the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional to Alfredo Cristiani, El Salvador, August 6, 1989. 10."Crònica del mes," Estudios Centroamericanos, año XLD7, no. 488 (June 1989): 507. 11.News Release of the Farabundo Marti Front for National Liberation and the Democratic Revolutionary Front, September 7, 1989. PEACEINELSALVADOR 197 recognized that they now had to govern the country, and they hoped that their policies could produce an economic turnaround. Killing peasants, labor leaders, or leftist sympathizers, as certain members of ARENA are notorious for having done, was neither desirable nor acceptable to the United States. And Cristiani understood the cost to his government of losing U.S. congressional support. At his June inauguration, the Salvadoran president unveiled his own peace plan, the central component of which was the creation of a permanent dialogue commission. In a strong call for talks, the new president declared that "[t]he process of dialogue . . . will not be easy, or simple, but we are ready to initiate it immediately" without preconditions.12 His first attempt at forming a commission failed, however, largely because it lacked decisionmaking power. According to one veteranjournalist, the commission idea "was the minimum you could get away with in terms of a call for dialogue."13 Nonetheless, Cristiani reacted positively later in the summer when the major opposition political parties approached him with the idea ofserving as a channel of communication between the government and the FMLN. The opposition party leaders, including members of the leftist Democratic Convergence, became convinced that Cristiani was sincere about dialogue. But they also soon realized that the president had little room to maneuver. In fact, by the time the FMLN announced in early September that it would accept almost all of the government's conditions for dialogue, Cristiani had been working for nearly a month to placate the far Right. Cristiani's cabinet and ARENA party leaders reportedly held a stormy, day-long meeting on the commission issue but could not reach agreement. As Guillermo Ungo, one ofthe leaders ofthe Democratic Convergence, noted at the time, "Cristiani thought this was going to be easy. He is in a very difficult position [ofhaving to consult with the economic oligarchy, the Army, ARENA party leaders, and the United States] .... Cristiani has a better attitude and the political will," Ungo added, "but it is very difficult for him to do as he pleases."14 The Regional and International Situation Regional and international forces played a major role in the dialogue process that developed last year. In Latin America the broad transition 12."Discurso presidencial y reacciones," Estudios Centroamericanos, año XLrV, no. 488 (June 1989): 523. 13.Interview with Douglas Farah of the Washington Post, July 12, 1989. 14.Interview with Guillermo Ungo, August 22, 1989. 198 SAISREVIEW to democratic government has replaced the appeals for revolutionary change that characterized the 1960s and 1970s. The 1980s witnessed both a collapse of bureaucratic authoritarian regimes and a growing recognition that world competition was moving from the military sphere to the economic arena. Glasnost and perestroïka in the Soviet Union seemed to reinforce this trend. In Central America, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's determination to improve relations with the United States and restructure the Soviet economy prompted a withdrawal from the region. The Soviets reportedly halted arms shipments to the Nicaraguan government in January 1989 and called on the FMLN to seek support from Western nations because it could not underwrite another revolutionary regime. These changes in the international situation not only helped prompt the rebels' reassessment of their goals but also maintained pressure on them to negotiate. In its own effort to make use of international pressure, the FMLN worked to increase the involvement of the United Nations (UN) and the Organization of American States (OAS) in the settlement of the war. Both the Cristiani government and the FMLN were at times talking past each other and toward the U.S. Congress and international opinion. Each sought U.S. and international acceptance of its democratic credentials . ARENA, for its part, sought to alter its image as the party of rightwing death squads. For example, as Congress was considering legislation to condition a portion of U.S. aid on progress toward negotiations, an overeager President-elect Cristiani proposed immediate talks—two and a half months before his inauguration. Likewise, the FMLN offered new peace proposals just prior to two high-profile events for Cristiani—his post-election meeting with President Bush and his inauguration. The fifth summit ofthe Central American presidents in early August in Honduras gave a boost to the move toward dialogue. Having received a letter from the FMLN stating that talks were in the making, the region's presidents rejected Cristiani's effort to equate the demobilization of the Contras with that of the FMLN, but did reaffirm their support for the rebels' eventual disarmament. Both sides could claim victory; the FMLN felt it had increased its legitimacy, while Cristiani placated his right wing with a statement from Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega that eventually the FMLN would have to lay down its weapons. No Movement by the United States or El Salvador's Armed Forces The Bush administration, calling the January 1989 FMLN peace proposal "worthy of serious and substantive consideration," initially PEACEINELSALVADOR 199 signaled a major change in U.S. policy toward El Salvador.15 And as the dialogue began in late summer the administration stated that "[w]e sincerely hope that at the ongoing government-FMLN talks, both sides will agree to a definitive end to the conflict. This can be accomplished only if both sides engage seriously with the goal ofachieving agreement . . . ."16 In contrast to the Reagan administration's blanket rejection of serious negotiations, this response demonstrated a pragmatic outlook. Yet the signal that nothing substantive had changed since the Reagan years was much stronger. The U.S. embassy in San Salvador often stated that the FMLN's change in position was a hoax. Embassy officials maintained that the FMLN had a secret "Plan Fire" to use negotiations to promote mass insurrection. According to opposition party members, U.S. Ambassador William Walker saw no reason to change course as long as President Cristiani was doing well. In addition, Ambassador Walker worked to rehabilitate Roberto D'Aubuisson, a cashiered army major whose past ties to death squad activity are well-documented, who in the early 1980s was reportedly involved in a plot to assassinate the United States ambassador, and who almost certainly masterminded the 1980 assassination ofArchbishop Oscar Romero. Apparently, the United States believed that right-wing extremists could change, while left-wing extremists could not—even though Washington had never put the Left's claims to the test. Last year, liberals in Congress unsuccessfully sought to condition military aid on progress toward negotiations. The debate sent a signal to intransigent elements in El Salvador that they would have to at least make a show of support for talks. This congressional pressure, however, never came close to forcing a fundamental change in U.S. policy—change that could have bolstered the fragile dialogue process. Consequently, while the Salvadoran military paid Hp service to dialogue, it staunchly declared that its "organic structure" was not subject to negotiation.17 The paramount concern ofthe Salvadoran armed forces is the integrity ofthe military as an institution. Virtually any significant societal change is perceived as a threat to its position, or that of its farright civilian allies, and therefore unacceptable. Installing presidents, rigging elections, and repressing the political opposition, the military has maintained a corrupt and ruthless grip on Salvadoran society for over halfa century. The military is responsible for 15.Washington Post, January 27, 1989, A16. 16.State Department press conference, September 18, 1989. 17.Colonel Orlando Zepeda, Vice-Minister of Defense, "Al Día," Channel 12 News, San Salvador, August 18, 1989. 200 SAISREVIEW the deaths of many tens of thousands of Salvadorans. Since 1982, with the start of a series ofU.S.-sponsored elections, it has allowed civilians to take office but not the reins of power that matter most. As a recent yearlong study of the Salvadoran armed forces concluded, the military is "an already powerful institution grown virtually untouchable on the spoils of a lucrative war."18 With regard to the war, while moderate members of the army are flexible, the most powerful officers view compromise as an unacceptable sign ofweakness. The major debate within the military, thus, is not over whether or not the military should be subordinate to civilian rule. Rather, the split in the military is between officers who believe working with and profiting from the United States is beneficial and those who are angry that the United States has given them the firepower to wipe out the rebels and their civilian sympathizers but will not let them use it. This latter group prefers the so-called "total war" approach. Motives Behind the FMLN's Offensive The FMLN offensive seriously weakened, albeit temporarily, President Cristiani and created severe problems for him with the right wing. It also uprooted the extensive FMLN clandestine network in San Salvador and eroded confidence in the FMLN's desire for talks. The opening for the political opposition was virtually shut off. Death squad-style killing quickly re-emerged and the view that the war could not be won militarily received even greater justification. Equally significant, however, is that the offensive was an extension of the FMLN's two-pronged strategy begun in January of last year: use of both carrot and stick to achieve a cease-fire and, ultimately, a political settlement based on "democratic" elections. From the start, Cristiani's difficulties in forming his own dialogue commission could not have given the FMLN much confidence. The FMLN received favorable attention for its September proposal to begin incorporating into the political process, provided reforms were made in the electoral system and the structure of the Army. But the delegation sent by the government to the first round of talks was relatively low level. And at the subsequent round, the government delegation clearly backed away from Cristiani's previous display offlexibility, refusing to consider concessions until the FMLN first surrendered its arms. 18. Joel Millman, "El Salvador's Army: A Force Unto Itself," New York Times Magazine, December 10, 1989, 95. PEACE IN EL SALVADOR 201 Soon after the second round, political violence against leftists rose dramatically, plunging the Cristiani government into crisis and helping make impossible, from the FMLN point of view, a continuation of the dialogue. Perhaps as important as the violence was the FMLN's recognition that the key ingredient to making the process viable—the strong support ofthe United States—was missing. Since March 1987, when the FMLN assaulted the army base at El Paraíso, the United States had been claiming that the FMLN was finished militarily. The United States refused to show a strong sign of support for compromise that would have strengthened the pro-dialogue position on the Left and, until it was too late, apparently declined to take steps to help prevent a violent right-wing reaction to serious dialogue. Given the circumstances, the FMLN decided that it had to prove itself on the battlefield, demonstrate that the economy would continue to disintegrate as long as the war continued, and further tempt the rightwing assassins to expose themselves. Otherwise, the rebels believed the government's stalling at the negotiating table would continue. Some members ofthe FMLN did have other motives for launching the offensive, including igniting a popular uprising. But FMLN leaders have acknowledged that they cannot win militarily; these other motives simply reflected rhetorical zeal, wishful thinking by rebel ground troops, and the continuing belief by some rebel fighters that they can win the war.19 It bears reiterating here that the FMLN is not monolithic. Not all of its members fully agree with the new approach of the movement. For example, the December assassination of the former chief of the Supreme Court, apparently by the FMLN, indicated either a hardline tendency or a lack of control over rebel commandos. President Cristiani and the FMLN Offensive Judging from his efforts to promote dialogue, it appears that if President Cristiani had the power he would seriously pursue a political settlement. Cristiani is among a growing group ofbusinessmen associated with the Right who take a positive view of negotiations. The war is clearly a disaster for business. Leading opposition party figures believe he is amenable to compromise. And so does the FMLN. Less than two months after the offensive, a rebel diplomat stated the FMLN's belief that Cristiani genuinely supported a negotiated settlement.20 19.Washington Post, November 28, 1989, A20. 20.Interview with a rebel diplomat, January 19, 1990. 202 SAISREVIEW Opposition political party members convinced ofPresident Cristiani's sincerity have noted his political inexperience and naivete. Until recently, he has appeared not to understand the motives and methods of the far right and the military. Cristiani, said a U.S. officialjust before the FMLN offensive, "is seeing all the guys in his corner aren't great guys, that not all the accusations about them were made up by the press and the United States."21 The president is despised by members of the right wing, who expected to get someone far less moderate. Much like President Duarte during the Reagan era, Cristiani is being cultivated by the Bush administration as the moderate center between the extremes of the Left and Right. His political survival is the foundation ofU.S. policy, and the limited power he holds stems from the support he receives from Washington. To Congress his presence as a democratically elected president confirms that El Salvador is an emerging democracy. But the fact remains that Cristiani, who does not even have full control of his own party, is largely playing a role defined for him by the United States. Although he supports a political settlement, it would be preposterous to believe that he could, or would ever be willing to, go over the heads of the ARENA right wing, the military, and the United States to achieve one. Days before the FMLN launched its offensive, the right wing increased its attacks against the leftist opposition, putting Cristiani's leadership in crisis. President Bush sent Assistant Secretary ofState Bernard Aronson and the chiefofthe U.S. Southern Command, General Maxwell Thurman, to El Salvador to meet with more than a dozen of the highest ranking Salvadoran military commanders. According to a senior U.S. official, "The message was that whoever is doing this stuff is doing the work of the guerrillas for them. It doesn't matter where it is coming from, it has to be stopped."22 Clearly the United States believed the military was significantly linked to the violence. As intended by the rebels and despite Washington's efforts, the offensive further demonstrated Cristiani's lack of institutional power. Questioned about the military's raids on churches and labor unions, the murder ofthe Jesuit priests, and the Salvadoran attorney general's veiled threat to the country's bishops, Ambassador Walker responded that Cristiani had "management control problems."23 He also asserted, "I am sure things are happening that Cristiani would prefer not happen."24 21.Washington Post, November 8, 1989, A33. 22.Washington Post, November 8, 1989, A33. 23.Washington Post, December 19, 1989, Cl. 24.Washington Post, November 21, 1989, A20. PEACEINELSALVADOR 203 With the ambassador doing all he could to downplay the president's responsibility, it was obvious that Cristiani was not making the country's key decisions. They were being made by, or with the tacit approval of, high-level military officers and their right-wing civilian allies. As one diplomat remarked: "What is blindingly clear is that Cristiani does not have control of the far right. Some of the people may not be in the [ARENA] party, and I don't believe the party is organizing the violence, but they are out of control."25 A conservative Salvadoran politician summed up the situation best, stating that "Cristiani has become almost irrelevant in this."26 After the offensive, when a planeload ofanti-aircraft weapons destined for the FMLN was shot down, Cristiani got the break he—and the United States—needed to bolster himself against the right wing. Evidence clearly indicated that the weapons had come from Nicaragua. The media's attention and President Bush's determination to make the shipment a major issue of the Malta summit shifted the debate on El Salvador away from internal human rights atrocities and toward external intervention. Subsequently, the five Central American presidents, at a meeting in early December, significantly strengthened Cristiani's political hand. For the first time, Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega recognized the legitimacy of the Cristiani government. The FMLN was vaguely equated with the Contras. Also for the first time, despite the military's involvement in tens of thousands of killings, the prosecution of the Jesuit case led to the indictment of a military officer. While the case has deeply divided the military and led to rumors of a coup, Cristiani seems to be on a shaky road to recovery—until the next crisis comes along. The International Arena After the FMLN Offensive In the wake of the FMLN offensive, regional and international influences are playing a much greater role in the conflict. As the FMLN was launching its attacks, it was competing for world attention with the collapse of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe. The Eastern bloc was turning sharply away from totalitarian regimes and centralized economies . Cuba, a key FMLN ally, was becoming increasingly isolated from its erstwhile allies. Thus, if the Soviet Union's new thinking was partially responsible for the FMLN shift toward democratic elections over a year 25.Washington Post, November 20, 1989, Al. 26.Ibid. 204 SAISREVIEW ago, the revolutionary changes in the communist world since then should prompt it to moderate further. Meanwhile, in Costa Rica in December, the Central American presidents used their influence to bolster President Cristiani, to pressure the FMLN to return to the negotiating table, and perhaps most important, to keep the crumbling regional peace plan alive. They asked the UN to play a greater role in El Salvador, a long-time goal of the FMLN. The UN, in turn, has called for the United States, the Soviet Union, and Cuba to become directly involved in dialogue.27 But after apparently agreeing to a UN mediating role, Cristiani, under pressure from the Right, now wants the UN only to assist in arranging new talks. And as of this writing, the Bush administration supports this position. The FMLN, on the other hand, wants the UN to play a direct role and, following the assassination of a Socialist party leader, deferred on its initial agreement to meet with the government at the UN. The Sandinista electoral loss in Nicaragua last February will have a deep impact on El Salvador. Whether or not its effect will favor a political settlement of the war remains to be seen. On the one hand, a peaceful transfer of power and an end to the contra war may focus U.S. and international attention on resolving the last major Central American conflict. On the other hand, the far Right in El Salvador, especially ifnot countered by the Bush administration, could perceive the increased isolation of the FMLN as an opportunity to renew its attempt to achieve military victory. In any case, a new government in Nicaragua increases pressure on the FMLN to reach agreement on laying down its weapons. As a senior rebel commander stated in the wake of the Nicaraguan election, "The FMLN is feeling the need to end the war."28 Finally, last November's Malta summit demonstrated to the FMLN and to Washington how far Moscow is willing to go to assure the administration that it was not supporting the rebels militarily. According to a French news report in late November, the Soviets told high-ranking Cuban and Nicaraguan officials to stop supplying arms to the FMLN.29 After Malta, President Bush and Secretary ofState James Baker accepted Soviet claims that they had not directly supplied the FMLN and were pressuring their allies to halt arms shipments.30 While they, the Cubans especially, may not go along with that advice, the Soviets are sending a clear message. 27.New York Times, December 18, 1989, A6. 28.Washington Post, February 27, 1990, Al7. 29.Washington Post, November 30, 1989, A37. 30.Washington Post, December 4, 1989, Al. PEACEINELSALVADOR 205 The Shift in U.S. Policy "El Salvador needs peace and the only path to peace is at the negotiating table," stated Assistant Secretary of State Aronson at a January 24 Congressional hearing.31 His words represented a significant shift in the U.S. position on the war. He clearly recognized that the Reagan policy ofmarginalizing the FMLN militarily had failed and that it was time to pursue peace through dialogue. The assistant secretary's statements before the Congressional subcommittee were important for other reasons, including the recognition that the FMLN had legitimate concerns about its safety before returning to political life and that the administration should have played a stronger role in the pre-offensive government-FMLN dialogue process. He avoided calling on the FMLN to surrender its weapons before talks could begin and responded favorably to calls for increasing pressure on the military to improve human rights and reach a settlement. At the same time, however, Aronson clearly downplayed the military's role as the key power in the country, its continued involvement in human rights abuse, and the lack of genuine democracy. To these elements one must add, among others, U.S. involvement in the intimidation of a Salvadoran witness to the Jesuit killings; Washington's insinuation that U.S. citizen Jennifer Casólo, who was charged by the Salvadoran Army with harboring arms for the FMLN, was guilty; and Ambassador Walker's suggestion as late as early January that the FMLN was responsible for the Jesuit murders. As of this writing, the Bush administration's message is mixed. Its words have not been backed by action. In testimony before the Senate on February 1, Secretary of State Baker stated, "In El Salvador, we believe this is the year to end the war through a negotiated settlement that guarantees safe political space for all Salvadorans."32 And a week later General Thurman, chief of the U.S. Southern Command, endorsed talks between the FMLN and the Cristiani government to end the war and stated his belief that the 31.Assistant Secretary of State Bernard W. Aronson, prepared statement before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Western Hemispheric Affairs, January 24, 1990, 5. 32.Secretary of State James A. Baker, III, prepared statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "U.S. Foreign Policy Priorities and FY 1991 Budget Request," Current Policy No. 1245 (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State, February 1, 1990), 5. 206 SAISREVIEW parties were on that course.33 In late February, Secretary Baker reiterated his position of early in the month, but his testimony indicated that the administration was not taking any initiative on its own.34 In short, given the absence of any clear effort to promote talks, the Bush administration has left wide open the question ofhow committed it really is to its new course. Meanwhile, the Salvadoran military should not be expected to negotiate on its own accord. As the investigation into the Jesuit murders indicated, only under intense U.S. and international pressure will the military respond—and even then only haltingly. The indictment of a colonel sets an important precedent. But, under heavy pressure from the armed forces, President Cristiani has made it clear that no more indictments in the Jesuit case will be forthcoming, despite the unmistakable signs of the involvement of other high-ranking members of the military. And despite unprecedented U.S. involvement—including support from the FBI, a Congressional task force, the Pentagon, and Congressional delegations—the investigation was circumscribed. The Congressional task force named to monitor progress in the Jesuit case is likely to protest the cover-up. Although the debate was expected to center around appropriations legislation this spring, due to lack of support in Congress, as of this writing it appears unlikely that aid to El Salvador will be reduced. Rather, should a colonel ultimately be convicted—which now appears increasingly dubious—President Cristiani is likely to be highly praised and the involvement ofother military officers will, tragically, be forgotten. The Future for El Salvador After a decade of war and the loss of over 70,000 lives, the principal actors in the Salvadoran conflict have come or are coming to the realization that military victory is no longer an option. This trend is critically important for the long run. But for the armed forces and their right-wing allies, military stalemate does not call for change. For reasons of ideology and institutional self-protection, and because officers are reaping tremendous profit from U.S. largesse, the military bitterly opposes compromise with the rebels. Ironically, on the issue of seeking 33.Testimony of General Maxwell R. Thurman, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command, stenographic transcript of hearing before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, February 8, 1990. 34.Statement of Secretary of State James A. Baker III, before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, February, 22, 1990, 13. PEACEINELSALVADOR 207 a political settlement, President Cristiani has more in common with the FMLN leadership than he does with members of his ARENA party and the military. In 1989 both Cristiani and the rebels were out in front of the Bush administration with regard to negotiations. This year the White House has clearly shifted policy, but has not acted on its new approach and appears too absorbed in other areas of the world to focus on the crisis in El Salvador. It remains to be seen how much this will change and whether Congress will push the White House to seek an end to the fighting. The Bush administration is pragmatic and determined to achieve congressional bipartisanship in support of its foreign policies. With regard to El Salvador, as the FMLN offensive demonstrated, this goal is only going to get more difficult to maintain if the administration refuses to provide more concrete support for a negotiated settlement. The future promises more violence, increased death squad activity, further deterioration ofthe Salvadoran economy, a crumbling ofthe democratic framework erected during the 1980s, and a major political headache for President Bush. Fortunately, the Bush administration appears to have begun to see the writing on the wall. International efforts, especially those emanating from the meetings of the Central American presidents, will continue to play an important role. The changes in the communist world, especially in Nicaragua, may make it more difficult for the FMLN to acquire arms, but that is unlikely to effect its fighting capability. Over the course of the long war, the FMLN has consistently demonstrated a strong degree ofself-sufficiency, regularly finding local sources of weapons, and its civilian base of support remains solid. Even if the United States actively works for a political settlement, peace is a long and difficult way off. There is a tendency to believe that the United States can impose its will on its allies in El Salvador. This is often far from the reality. For example, despite years ofU.S. efforts to get the military to respect human rights, torture and murder by its members continue today with regularity. In addition, U.S. pressure to prosecute the Jesuit case so angered the military that coup rumors surfaced and "[U.S.] advisors [have been] virtually frozen out of the war effort."35 Fear of further deterioration of its relations with the Salvadoran officer corps will tend to deter the Bush administration from pressing the military to accept a political settlement. A negotiated settlement, therefore, cannot be achieved without the support of the United States, but it will not necessarily be accomplished 35. Washington Post, February 6, 1990, A18. 208 SAISREVIEW even with strong U.S. backing. Rather than accepting compromise and reform, the Salvadoran Army, led by hardliners, could conceivably choose to reject U.S. assistance, as it did in 1977 when President Carter tied aid to human rights improvements. The military would then attempt to go it alone, and the war would escalate until a winner emerged. But regardless of how convinced the Bush administration becomes of the FMLN's sincerity in seeking peace and democratic elections, it would not allow its relations with the Salvadoran army to deteriorate to such an extent out of a reluctance to jeopardize the traditional foundation of proU .S. stability in El Salvador. During any future dialogue process the position taken by the far Right in the Salvadoran armed forces will have to be firmly addressed by the Bush administration. However, the fierce opposition of some of the highest-ranking officers must not prevent the United States from immediately using its leverage on the military. The United States must reduce military aid—to the point of cutting it off completely—if the Salvadoran Army does not respond to efforts to end the war. Threats from the U.S. Congress to cut aid now carry little weight because they have been made so many times before without the political will to back them up. Therefore, if President Bush is unwilling to use the aid lever, Congress must use it for him. An immediate cut-off of all military aid to El Salvador would be unwise since it would precipitate an even more violent struggle for power. Instead, during this year's debate and each subsequent year, Congress should critically assess the Bush administration 's attempt at achieving its stated goals. If its assessment shows a lack of genuine effort, Congress should reduce aid for the year by a designated percentage. The seriousness of the administration's effort should be measured by the agenda it sets—its willingness to outline explicitly what it expects in terms of achieving a cease-fire, reform in the military, an end to human rights abuses, and a final settlement in which the FMLN lays down its weapons and joins the democratic process. On the other hand, ifthe war begins to wind down, high levels ofU.S. military aid can be diverted to restore the Salvadoran economy and to address the country's deep social inequities. The notion that continued infusions of military aid are necessary to placate the army must be discarded. Congress should act on the basis of a well-developed alternative policy aimed at conveying its seriousness about achieving a political settlement. Legislation introduced in February by Senator Christopher Dodd, a Democrat from Connecticut with an influential vote on congressional policy toward Central America, indicates that Congress has begun to consider seriously some minimal conditions on aid to El Salvador. PEACEINELSALVADOR 209 Finally, if El Salvador is to achieve peace and democracy, the people of that country must acquire the freedom to express their views without fear of reprisal. As of this writing, the political space for the opposition is minimal, far from its height before the offensive, and not close to what it must be to accommodate a return ofthe rebels to political life. As they have in the past, popular organizations, the Catholic Church, and opposition political parties—along with the United States—will have a key role to play in any opening. El Salvador cannot afford to wait any longer for a real and sustained U.S. commitment to peace. Determined to preserve their privileged position within the status quo, the Salvadoran military and its civilian allies will be the greatest obstacle to a settlement. The depth of the U.S. commitment to change will determine whether and how fast peace can be achieved. If the Bush administration backs up its words with deeds, the FMLN will likely view it as a sign that favorable moves on its part will not be fruitless. The process may take years as the two sides evaluate their respective options, solidify their positions, and fight and negotiate at the same time. But if peace is ever going to come, it has to be built—and the process has to begin today. ...