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CHINA AND THE WORLD____ AFTER TIANANMEN SQUARE Hall Gardner O. 'nJune 4, 1989, as the entire world looked on in shock and disbelief, tanks from the Chinese People's Liberation Army stormed Beijing's Tiananmen Square, ruthlessly killing hundreds, perhaps thousands, of pro-democracy student demonstrators. The Tiananmen Square massacre and the ensuing crackdown, in which at least ten thousand people were detained or imprisoned, shocked nearly everyone. Even some high-level Chinese officials expressed horror. Few observers had anticipated this final turn of events as the student movement rapidly gained strength and support throughout May. Prior to the May 19 declaration of martial law, most analysts had argued that such a closing of the iron fist of repression was the most extreme (and least likely) of four possible solutions to the deepening crisis. Instead, they believed Beijing would most likely continue its "time will tell" policy—insincere discussions with student groups, without any official recognition of the pro-democracy movement, and a feigned interest in reform.1 Once martial law was declared, the government's apparent inability to enforce it led many to believe that only widescale violence directed against the protesters would restore order in the country. And as this was considered a wholly improbable scenario, many observers 1. See, for example, Hall Gardner, "Far from Beijing, the Students Stand Up," Los Angeles Times, May 18, 1989, part II, 7. Hall Gardner is visiting assistant professor of international relations at theJohns Hopkins Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. During the academic year 1988-89, he was adjunct professor at theJohns Hopkins Nanjing University Center for Chinese and American Studies in Nanjing, China. 133 134 SAIS REVIEW predicted that Beijing either would be forced to make concessions or would continue its "time will tell" approach. In the euphoria of late May, serious observers began to entertain the belief that the pro-democracy movement might succeed. One hope— that Wan Li, the moderate president of the National People's Assembly , would return from his visit to the United States and call on the Assembly to end martial law—proved to be extremely naive. So too did the belief that the party leadership was so divided that it could not operate effectively. For much as in the "hundred flowers" campaign of the Cultural Revolution, the tolerance of free assembly and speech in the weeks following the declaration of martial law was not entirely due to a split in the leadership. Rather, it represented a calculated effort to expose the dissidents. In the same sinister spirit the government reversed its earlier decision to block satellite coverage of domestic unrest, realizing that the Western media could actually assist in identifying (for later punishment) so-called class enemies. Thus, the news correspondents who lionized the pro-democracy movement's leaders and supporters unwittingly aided the generally inefficient public security forces. The Chinese Communist party, adapting Leninist doctrine, shrewdly exploited Western "contradictions" to serve its own interests. The presence of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev provided another reason to believe that the party would not violently repress the prodemocracy movement. World-wide media attention, it was thought, would somehow deter violence by a leadership supposedly concerned with building a positive world image. An apparent split within the military provided a final reason for believing that Beijing would not resort to repression. As it was, students who carried banners reading "The People's Army loves the People" were not entirely screaming against the wind. Two army marshals , Xu Xiangqian and Nie Rongzhen, both of whom had served with Mao, called for order but would not commit themselves to violence. Furthermore , 150 active and retired senior commanders opposed government leader Deng Xiaoping's statement that the party had to be "willing to spill some blood" to restore order. Yet, these army officials, like everyone else, were waiting to see which way the wind would blow in the party hierarchy, before committing themselves fully to any one policy.2 Background to the Crackdown and Repression With the benefit of hindsight, three major developments, all with international ramifications, can be identified that should have forewarned 2. International Herald Tribune, June 21, 1989, 8. CHINA AFTER TIANANMEN SQUARE 135...

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