The U.S. Maritime Strategy (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 229 However, in his attempt to avoid the quagmire of reducing world politics to unconscious physical forces, Modelski, at times,offers evidence that appears to contradict his assertions. Thus, after offering a convincing argument for the prevalence of repetitive power cycles that end in cathartic global wars, Modelski offers the proposition that, faced with the horror of nuclear war, future transfers of power will be undertaken peacefully. Unfortunately, he cannot have it both ways. He offers no tangible evidence that humanity has somehow grown wiser in the nuclear era. In fact, history falls convincingly on the other side, demonstrating that the use of nuclear weapons not only is possible but also has been seriously contemplated on a number of occasions. While hope is held out that a future global war will somehow be averted, Modelski does not offer sufficient evidence to convince the reader that such a transition to a more civilized international system is likely in the discernible future. The final verdict on Long Cycles in World Politics is thus mixed. Modelski presents an extremely thorough and convincing argument in support of his basic premise that world history in the past six centuries has followed a discernible pattern, divided into five long cycles that are central to any historical analysis. However, Modelski is somewhat less successful in his second agenda: convincing the reader that upon the recognition of the current global situation (that is, nearing the end of a long cycle), a future world war may be averted by the alteration of this cyclical mechanism. One hopes that he is right, but his own evidence appears to point to the contrary, to a continued repetition of the long cycle in a largely familiar pattern. To argue the contrary is to dispute the fundamental concept of a recurring pattern that operates, for the most part, independently of conscious preconception. Modelski fails to convince the reader that these two ideas are not mutually exclusive. The U.S. Maritime Strategy. By Norman Friedman. London: James Publishing Co., 1988. 200 pp. $29.95/hardcover. Reviewed by Cdr. fohn Dailey, USN, M.I.P.P. candidate, SAIS. In writing The U.S. Maritime Strategy, Norman Friedman has done the U.S. Navy, the defense establishment, and the country as a whole a great service indeed. Not content with simply explaining maritime strategy, he has placed the entire discussion within the context of the national, historical, and geopolitical background that shaped the concept over time. It will enrage some, encourage others, and enlighten just about everybody. Friedman's central theme is stated in the introduction; namely, that the essential elements of U.S. maritime strategy are neither new nor arbitrary. What is novel, however, is that it is a publicly expressed war-fighting concept. Though this is hardly news within the strategic community of the U.S. Navy, Friedman's clear presentation will do much to increase the general understanding of this logical though nonetheless controversial doctrine. 230 SAIS REVIEW The author begins with a discussion of U.S. and Soviet national strategies, contrasting the enduring security requirements of a continental power with those of an insular nation. He makes a persuasive case, supported by interesting historical examples, that U.S. maritime strategy is both necessary and plausible. The centerpiece of U.S. strategic policy— containment— rightfully receives extensive treatment. The nature, instruments, and strategies of sea power represent the heart of the book. Simply stated, sea power is the ability of a nation to use the seas, "the greatest of all highways," as it so chooses in pursuit of its particular interests. In peacetime this means the availability of a navy and a merchant fleet to support the nation's commerce. During crisis and war, the central question becomes whether free use of those "highways" can be secured for friends and denied to enemies. Choice between sea control and sea denial then serves as a touchstone for subsequent decisions on critical matters, such as force structure, operations, and tactics. Friedman cogently makes the point that, though theoretically autonomous , nations are forced by geopolitical realities into a kind of Hobson's choice. The United States, because it relies so heavily on the sea...