Challenges to Deterrence: Resources, Technology, and Policy (review)

284 SAIS REVIEW foreign-policy authority remained within the jurisdiction of the State Department . The president met frequently with a small number of advisors, particularly at the end of his administration, but Henderson concludes that these meetings never supplanted regular NSC meetings. Eisenhower consistently used the NSC for "promoting forward planning, facilitating open debate and assisting the president in crystallizing policy options." Since Eisenhower's terms in office, the formulation of foreign policy has become more informal. Presidents have failed to clarify job descriptions adequately and have relied heavily on small groups of trusted advisors. The national security adviser is no longer the neutral policy coordinator he once was, so that he tends to compete with the secretary of state and the secretary of defense , who are the administration's legitimate policymakers. Henderson draws a lesson from his comparisons between the Eisenhower style of management and those ofsuccessive presidents: an institutionalized, organized means of policy formulation and implementation, with job responsibilities clearly delineated by the president, avoids the problems that will occur if the NSC, the Department of State, and the Department of Defense are at loggerheads. While Henderson's recommendations are valid, thoughtful, and timely, his supporting evidence often exaggerates the truth. Dwight D. Eisenhower was harshly criticized for heavy-handed leadership upon leaving office. However, in his attempt to revise some of those severe judgments, Henderson errs too far on the other side, depicting Eisenhower as nearly perfect. He finds little to fault in Eisenhower's administrative skills. In addition, he frequently cites single incidents or meetings as supporting evidence for generalizations applying to Eisenhower's entire eight years. In sum, Henderson's blind devotion to Eisenhower leaves the reader wondering how credible his conclusions are on the Eisenhower White House. If Henderson praises Eisenhower's administrative and management capabilities too lavishly, he nevertheless pin-points several pressing organization problems within the foreign policymaking system ofthe U.S. government . As it establishes its operating rules, the new administration would be wise to address these issues. Challenges to Deterrence: Resources, Technology, and Policy. Edited by StephenJ. Cimbala. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1987. 328 pp. $39.95/cloth. Reviewed by Davidf. Karl, M.A. candidate, SAIS. In 1979 Henry Kissinger shocked governments on both sides of the Atlantic when he declared the imminent demise of much of the deterrent strategy that has formed the foundation of Western security in the postwar era. If his prognosis was overstated, the diagnosis was prescient enough. The present decade has witnessed what might be termed the "crisis of deterrence." What were once issues of proprietary concern for a select community of analysts became topics of discussion in the larger public domain. Whatever the immediate aims of the nuclear freeze movement, the pastoral letters of the American Catholic and Episcopal bishops, and European disarmament groups, all were united at the BOOK REVIEWS 285 conceptual level in their implicit criticism of the present structure of nuclear deterrence. This general trend was strangely abetted by the public statements of the American and Soviet governments, at one in their (at least rhetorical) desire for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Parallel to this, disquieting technological advances and operational developments ensured that the nature and instrumentality of strategic deterrence became a subject of increased debate for national leaders, defense officials, and academics. This volume, a collection of disparate essays by individual authors, many of whom are recognizable to readers with some familiarity in the field ofstrategic studies, is one of the better contributions to the ongoing scholarly discussion of this subject. Forecasting anything so complex is a hazardous assignment, but each author's effort to sketch out a part of the evolving strategic dilemmas that policymakers must confront in crafting a sustainable strategy of deterrence is thoughtful and informative. The first two chapters, by Carnes Lord and Kevin N. Lewis, are especially noteworthy in skillfully framing the issues that will influence the evolution of nuclear strategy and injecting a sense of reality and proportion into the debate. Lord explores the technical and political variables that will come to bear on the future strategic environment. Perhaps not surprisingly, given his current employment as the national security adviser to the vice...