Castro's Quarrel with Moscow

CASTRtfS QUARREL WITH MOSCOW Ilya Prizel R»arely has a state visit by one leader of a socialist country to another done more to accentuate the differences between the two allies as did Gorbachev's recent visit to Havana. Despite the semblance of civility between the two leaders the animosity and differences between them were never far from the surface. Throughout the visit Gorbachev continued to herald the glories of perestroïka in the Soviet Union and the virtues of his conciliatory policies toward the United States. In his address to the Cuban National Assembly, Gorbachev, clearly referring to Cuba's foreign policy, stated: "We are against any theory or doctrine that advocates the export of revolution or counter revolution. . ."x Fidel Castro, for his part, persisted in ranting relentlessly about "Yanqui" Imperialism and pointedly stated in Gorbachev's presence that: "If a socialist country wants to build capitalism we must respect their right."2 Even on issues such as Latin America's foreign debt, where it seemed that there is much commonality in the positions of the USSR and Cuba, Gorbachev failed to announce the forgiveness of a substantial part of Cuba's debt to the USSR, nor did he endorse Castro's call for unilateral renunciation of the Latin American debt. Instead he called for a long moratorium supervised by a new United Nations agency. As if to paper over a rather divisive summit meeting, Cuba and the USSR signed a Treaty of Friendship 1.Pravda, April 6, 1989. 2.The Los Angeles Times, April, 5 1989. Ilya Prizel is assistant professor of Soviet studies at SAIS. His forthcoming book is entitled Latin America Through Soviet Eyes. 151 152 SAIS REVIEW and Cooperation which amounted to little more than a few generalities about the two countries' world outlook without specifying the obligations of either party.3 Finally, when Gorbachev left Havana the two leaders dispensed with the traditional Latin American abrazo. It is clear that there is a serious strain in the relationship between the USSR and Cuba. It is a clash of personalities, different ideological orientations, distinctive economic outlooks, and very different perceptions of the international situation in the post-Brezhnev era. The relationship between Castro and Gorbachev got a shaky start almost from the onset. In March 1985 when most of the entire world leadership converged on Moscow in order to attend Chernenko's funeral and assess the new youthful leader in the Kremlin, Castro was one of the very few leaders to skip the occasion. Given the history of Soviet-Cuban relations and the ritualized symbolism of the communist system, Castro's failure to travel to Moscow to meet the new leader of the socialist bloc was a clear and a calculated affront. The first meeting between the two leaders, which took place in 1986 when Castro attended the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) did little to improve the relationship. Unlike Brezhnev who always devoted a significant part of his report to the party analyzing progress in the Third World (an area where Cuba played a very important part) Gorbachev's report almost completely ignored the Third World. Castro's role at the congress was far less prominent than in Brezhnev's time. Furthermore, Gorbachev's declared revulsion for a "cult of personality," and his insistence on a less rhetorical and more businesslike (delovoii) approach accentuated the differences in personality and style. It is not, however, the difference in styles or even personal animosity that is at the root of the deterioration in Soviet-Cuban relations. A far more important source of friction is the Gorbachev revision of Brezhnev's "internationalist" foreign policy, which committed the USSR to support wars of national liberation throughout the Third World, and a reorientation of Soviet attention toward a more narrowly defined self-interest. It should be borne in mind that the alliance between the USSR and Cuba did not reach its full maturity until the early 1970s. Brezhnev, as a result of détente, shifted political competition with the United States away from the center of the international system, and emphasized the Third World as a new arena of competition with capitalism...