The Communist Challenge in the Caribbean and Central America (review)

294 SAIS REVIEW been sent to their posts with vague instructions that effectively grant them more autonomy than was perhaps intended. Finally, the editors call attention to the value of electoral democracy as seen by these ambassadors. While this is an inherently basic tenet of U.S. diplomacy, "North America can quickly lose faith in the electoral process in Latin America when the results threaten their interests or objectives or muddy their preconceptions." They attribute this to the unhappily correct notion that North Americans have traditionally thought themselves better able to determine what is best for Latin America than the Latin Americans. Ambassadors in Foreign Policy adds an interesting twist to traditional histories of U.S. involvement in Latin America, which have frequently focused on economic or ideological factors at the expense of writing about the people who carried out and, as is demonstrated aptly in this volume, helped shape policy in significant ways. The Communist Challenge in the Caribbean and Central America. By Howard J. Wiarda and Mark Falcoff, with Ernest Evans andjiri and Virginia Valenta. Washington, D.C: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1987. 249 pp. $11.50/paper. Reviewed by David Heimann, M. A. candidate, SAIS. In the introduction to The Communist Challenge in the Caribbean and Central America Howard J. Wiarda explains that the goal of this collection of essays "is to provide a reasoned, calm, dispassionate, and, we think, realistic analysis and assessment [of the communist threat in the region]." This is certainly a noble aim in an area where, more often than not, hysteria and ignorance are the driving forces behind policymaking. For the most part the essays in this collection do well in living up to its aim. The glaring exceptions to this spirit of levelheadedness are the essays written by Wiarda's partner, Mark Falcoff. Dr. Falcoffs pieces are entertaining only because he is such a master of cold war rhetoric. If there is such a thing as subtle hyperbole, Dr. Falcoff is guilty of using it. He sees a Cuban behind every rock and sees dire implications in the fact that, in Nicaragua, this Cuban is twice as likely to be a doctor as a military adviser. He casually refers to the Carter administration's policy toward the Sandinistas as "insane" — hardly a calm or dispassionate choice of words. Even more troubling than Dr. Falcoffs rhetoric, however, is the narrowness of his analysis. Specifically, he never looks at Soviet economic considerations. His conclusions seem to be based on the supposition that the Soviet Union has unlimited resources to spend in Latin America despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Another example of Dr. Falcoffs selectiveness comes in his analysis of the Nicaraguan economy. He bemoans the inefficiency and corruption of the Sandinistas and blames them for the country's economic woes without considering the huge economic drain of the war against the Contras. While it would be just as much of an error to base an analysis completely on the cost of the Contra war or Soviet economic limitations, their complete absence from Dr. Falcoffs account are a serious flaw in his work. BOOK REVIEWS 295 The remaining essays fare much better. The piece by Jiri and Virginia Valenta, "Soviet Strategies and Policies in the Caribbean and Central America ," is quite informative. It gives an excellent history of the evolution of Soviet policy in the area as well as an analysis of the different factors that have helped to shape it. While the Valentas clearly have their own opinions, they present their case without the distracting rhetoric that mars Dr. Falcoffs work. Especially interesting is their discussion of the Soviet perspective on domestic politics in the region. Dr. Wiarda's essay on "The Impact of Grenada in Central America" is also quite interesting. Making extensive use of documents captured during the 1983 intervention, Wiarda analyzes the relationship between the New Jewel Movement and the Soviets, Cubans, and Nicaraguans. Also, in his conclusion he discusses the effect of the 1983 American-led intervention, arguing that, while it did not completely cure the United States of its "Vietnam syndrome ," it did cause the Soviets, Cubans, and such revolutionary groups as the FMLN...