Reagan's Turn on Summit Diplomacy

REAGANS TURN________ ON SUMMIT DIPLOMACY Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr. .he Moscow 1988 superpower meeting, the fourth summit encounter between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, reflects a remarkable reversal in Reagan's use of summit diplomacy. The Reagan administration had held no U.S. -Soviet summit meetings for nearly five years, a record period without a summit since the administration of Harry S. Truman. During this dry spell many observers believed the renunciation of summitry to be one of the major changes in the tone and method of U.S. foreign policy engineered by President Reagan. Since November 1985, however, Reagan has scheduled four summit meetings in quick succession (Geneva in 1985, Reykjavik in 1986, Washington in 1987, and now Moscow in late May 1988). When he leaves Moscow, Reagan will have carried out more summit meetings with Soviet leaders than any other American president. Reagan's turn from one extreme to the other in his use of summit diplomacy should turn our attention to "summitry" as a diplomatic practice : its record, its sources, its uses, its abuses. The Utility of Summit Diplomacy Summit diplomacy may be defined as meetings held, for the real or nominal purpose of negotiation, between heads of governments rather than their subordinates. They are meetings not of professional diplomats Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr.. is research professor of international relations at SAIS and directs The Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute's program in Soviet and American national security policymaking. He worked in the Department of State from 1981 to 1984 as a member of the Policy Planning Staff and as a deputy assistant secretary. 69 70 SAIS REVIEW but of politicians. As such, summits have potential advantages as well as disadvantages. Political leaders often have wider horizons than diplomats ; they almost always have broader popular support. Frequently, politicians can take more initiative and can be more receptive to new ideas. Above all, political leaders, as opposed to diplomats, have great authority. These were qualities that permitted Charles de Gaulle to pull out of Algeria and Anwar Sadat to go to Jerusalem. The personal authority of the top leader is one of the biggest resources of a superpower. Worth more than several aircraft carriers, it is seldom used fully or effectively in support of policy; the stature of national leaders is often wasted on meetings with Cub Scouts. When the political conditions call for summit diplomacy, this vast reserve of power can fuel a summit meeting, and drive through effective conclusions, providing the diplomatic machine has been set up to tap this energy. Two means suggest themselves. One is the use of the leader for "public diplomacy," that is, to state a position, define the structure of diplomatic interaction, or force the other side into a difficult situation. Gorbachev used himself effectively in this way at the Reykjavik summit. Whether or not "public diplomacy" is considered a legitimate part of diplomacy, it plays a vital part in modern superpower tactics; it can be powerful and effective when used in a properly orchestrated summit. The second and more important method is the use of presidential authority to complete or push through negotiations that have already been partially resolved at the working level. The Camp David agreement —perhaps the finest hour of the Carter administration — is a good example. The Egyptian-Israeli peace process had bogged down in intractable wranglings among the negotiators. To reverse the resulting frustration and disillusionment would probably have been impossible without direct intervention by the leaders themselves. At the Camp David summit Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin used their authority to settle contentious issues, while Jimmy Carter used his personal relationships with both men to persuade, and his authority as U.S. president to exert pressure , thereby securing compromises from both leaders. Summit Meetings as a Tool of Diplomacy The powerful resources brought into play by summit diplomacy do not necessarily assure a successful outcome. Such thoughtful observers of diplomacy as Sir Harold Nicolson, Henry Kissinger, George F. Kennan, and Dean Acheson have been skeptical about the value of summit diplomacy. Their critique can be summarized and elaborated along the following lines. SUMMIT DIPLOMACY 71 Summit meetings differ from more routine diplomatic contacts because...