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CORRESPONDENCE Linda Crowl, editor Democracy in Guatemala To the Editor: Robert Garcia's article, "Guatemala Under Cerezo: A Democratic Opening," (SAIS Review 6:2, Summer-Fall 1986) acknowledges the abuses and omnipotence of the Guatemalan military yet expresses optimism about the prospects for completing a successful transition to genuine democratic rule. Congressman Garcia tells us that with the election of a civilian president in January 1986 "the military may be ready to return to the barracks and act like a national army instead of a gang of vandals ." To support his claim, Garcia cites General Hector Gramajo, who told the congressman that the military now intends to stay out of politics, as evidenced by its decision not to vote in the presidential elections of 1985. The Guatemalan military, says Garcia, "having once placed itself above the law . . . has undergone farreaching reform since 1982" and is now a "unified national army in service to the state" and ostensibly to legitimate civilian rule. Guatemala's democratic opening is allegedly based on this transformation of the military as an institution. Unfortunately, Congressman Garcia's analysis of the situation within Guatemala is weak and contradictory. The transformation of the armed forces since 1982 has eventually led to the unification of the military's high command, but one which is hardly more inclined to respect or obey civilian rule. In addition to driving out corruption , incompetence, and economic mismanagement , the young officers' coup of 1982 was also motivated by a comprehensive strategy of military counterinsurgency to contain Guatemala's rural guerrilla movement. As described by the Guatemalan army, the program "drainfed] the sea in order to kill the fish." The killings of civilians that followed in the wake of this military plan were unprecedented even by the most repressive regimes in the region. The counterinsurgency offensive was based on the dual concept of "security and development" and included a rationally calculated plan of systematic liquidation. Four colors of pins marked villages on maps within the walls of the military's high command. George Black, in his book Garrison Guatemala, described green pins marking safe villages, those with yellow or pink pins were progressively more suspect, and red pins marked those villages considered to be subversive. Focusing on rural areas where guerrilla activity was high, the 233 234 SAIS REVIEW military selectively repressed villages marked with yellow or pink pins while they attacked and destroyed those villages marked with red pins. The second element of the plan focused on "development" and created model villages in 1983. The military referred to these strategic hamlets as "development poles," but most observers saw them as an attempt to monitor and control the indigenous population. Most residents of "development poles" came from villages that the army has destroyed, and the poles remain under military supervision. More important than strategic hamlets to the plan were the civil defense patrols created by the military to control the local population. Though poorly armed, the defense patrols guard the entrances to villages, scout the surrounding areas for subversive activity, and monitor the movements of civilians in the highlands . The military claims that participation is voluntary, but adult males who refuse service are automatically suspected by the army of being guerrilla sympathizers or collaborators. This military domination of the countryside is the result of what Congressman Garcia describes as the armed forces' "farreaching reforms since 1982." Despite the presence of a civilian president in Guatemala since 1986, these strategic hamlets and civil defense patrols remain under military rule. The military can afford to relinquish its hold over the office of the president because its control over the nation is so complete. It is against this backdrop of military power and violence that one must view the presidential elections that brought Cerezo to office. Congressman Garcia tells us that "the relationship of the military to the state in Guatemala must be altered and more clearly defined." But in fact, the relationship of the military to the state and the office of the president in Guatemala has been unequivocally defined. The officers have permitted Cerezo to take office but only on the condition that the president undertake no major reforms and that the military remain in control...

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