In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

176 SAISREVIEW and the skeptical reports by press correspondents. He believes that the military failed to report to President Johnson that the bombing campaign would lead eventually to sending American troops to Vietnam. In the later stages ofthe war, Clifford argues, military intelligence failed to anticipate major offenses from the North. He gives the example of the Tet offensive, during which field commander General William Westmoreland and Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs General EarIe Wheeler were certain that a decisive battle would take place at Khe Sanh. Clifford is also critical of how Nixon and Kissinger ended the war because he believes their diplomacy led to the eventual victory ofthe communists in the North. He points out that America enjoyed little support from its allies in Asia and that Thailand and South Korea refused to send troops to Vietnam, while New Zealand participated with a contingent ofonly 300 soldiers. Liberalism, Clifford argues, has been the source of ideas and political and social innovations. The cyclical nature of American history, he maintains, will allow for the reemergence of Liberalism and the victory of the Democratic party in future presidential elections. In this sense, Clifford regards the Republican era in the White House as only one cycle of America's history. Clifford reflects on the style of the presidents whom he served. Kennedy was ". . . far more skeptical of official predictions [after the Bay of Pigs] . . . and after the Cuban Missile Crisis . . . became increasingly confident in his own instincts." In drawing a comparison between President Truman and President Johnson, Clifford observes that, "Truman's greatest strength was the ability to make complicated issues simple, while Johnson insisted on making simple issues complicated." Clifford devotes little discussion to the impact of advisors on the conduct of American foreign and domestic policies. Rather, he places emphasis on the personal side of his dealings with the presidents. In addition, Clifford, an elder statesman of the Democratic party, does not explain the failure of his party to win the presidential elections since 1976. Yet, these shortcomings do not lessen the importance of the book. Counsel to the President is a comprehensive journey into America's modern history and the Washington machinery. Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954. By Piero Gleijeses. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991. 421 pp. $29.95/Hardcover. Reviewed by Steve Griner, Returned Peace Corps Volunteer, Guatemala. From Jefferson to Bush, U.S. foreign policy has had a domineering influence on the domestic affairs of Caribbean and Central American nations. Economics, security or a combination of the two have usually been the impetus for this interference. Such was the case for U.S. policy towards Guatemala in 1954. Inaugurated in 1951, democratically elected Jacobo Arbenz made agrarian reform his top BOOK REVIEWS 177 priority and began to expropriate large tracts ofuncultivated land for redistribution . Since the United Fruit Company was the largest landholder in Guatemala, it in particular stood to lose a substantial amount of money if the expropriation continued. To avoid this economic hardship, company officials solicited the assistance of the United States government. A growing U.S. fear of communism in the hemisphere buoyed the cause of United Fruit. In the atmosphere ofMcCarthyism, it was not difficult to convince the Eisenhower administration to act. To combat the Arbenz threat, the administration nominated Jack Peurifoy, a boisterous ambassador who actively engaged in the internal politics to align forces against the Guatemalan President. In his book Shattered Hope, Piero Gleijeses adds "imperial hubris" as a third motivation for U.S. interference in the region and Guatemala was a case in point: "Consider the stage: there is Jack Peurifoy, that 'abusive, arrogant ambassador,' there is the Red Jacobo, and there are the bananas." Using extensive interviews, Gleijeses provides a readable yet meticulously documented account of the 1944—1954 revolutionary period of Guatemala. Beginning with a brief overview of the military dictatorship before 1944 and ending with the overthrow of President Arbenz, Gleijeses emphasizes the Guatemalan perspective in very human terms. Many books have detailed events leading to the overthrow of Arbenz and the extent to which the U.S. was involved , but only this one includes personal accounts ofthose Guatemalans closest to...

pdf

Share