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BRITAIN AND THE NEW EUROPEAN ORDER Lord Skidelsky B, 'ritain is the only member of the European Community (EC) to have lost a prime minister to the "new Europe." This is because in Britain, uniquely, the geopolitical argument triggered by the end ofbipolarity has been intertwined with the explosive issue of national sovereignty. On balance, most EC members have seen the partial disengagement of the United States and the Soviet Union from Europe as reinforcing the need for the political unification of the Twelve. By contrast, the British have favored "widening" the Community to include at least some of the newly independent countries of Eastern Europe, which means halting, or slowing down, political "deepening." There is a genuine geopolitical issue here about how best to help the transition from communism and planned economies to democracy and capitalism in Eastern Europe. But Great Britain's predilection in favor ofwidening reflects a long-standing opposition to political unification. That is why the debate in Britain has been so damaging for the ruling Conservative Party. It would have been equally so for the Labour Party, had it been in power. Lord Skidelsky is Professor of International Relations at Warwick University, England. His first volume of a biography ofJohn Maynard Keynes has met wide acclaim, and he is currently finishing the second volume. His books include Politicians and the Slump (1967); English Progressive Schools (1969); and Oswald Mosley (2nd edition 1980). This article will also appear as a chapter in From the Atlantic to the Urals: National Perspectives on the New Europe, edited by David P. Calleo and Philip H. Gordon. 101 102 SAISREVIEW What the current British debate shows is that any attempt to increase the Community's political competence triggers in Britain a national sovereignty reflex that, with the partial exception of France, scarcely exists elsewhere in the EC. For historical, ideological, and temperamental reasons, Margaret Thatcher embodied this reflex in her last two years in power, when the drive towards European unification accelerated. However , the resulting marginalization of Britain's influence over European developments was equally unacceptable to Britain's political, business, and financial elites. In November 1990, Mrs. Thatcher was replaced by the more diplomatic John Major. This change of leadership occurred, however, without any real resolution of the basic tension between the British dislike ofEurope's forward political momentum and the need, born of British self-interest, to retain influence over the direction and pace of the journey. Many in Britain have felt rather like Nicolae Ceausescu's architects—reluctant accomplices in a folly they can neither control nor disavow. But this tension has always been at the heart of Britain's relationship with the EC. The fact is that no agreement exists in Britain on carrying the European project much further than it has already gone. The extent of Britain's participation in the new European order will therefore depend on the shape of that order and the demands it makes on Britain. The kind of Europe into which Britain is most likely to fit is one built on permanent association between overlapping groups ofstates, rather than one based on the political integration of the EC. If the dominant members ofthe EC—Germany and France—insist on going further, or faster, down the road of political unification than is acceptable to the British, a multitrack, or multispeed, European Community seems inevitable. What is British? There is, of course, no single British attitude toward "Europe." Political opinion ranges from the Liberal Democrats, who are ardent federalists, to the neo-Gaullist Bruges Group. But the weight of opinion is differently distributed from that ofthe Continent, with most Britons to be found on the minimalist side of the European project. The two main political parties, Conservative and Labour, are split on Europe. A recent Market Research International poll of members of Parliament showed the Conservatives with a 60-40 percent pro-European edge. In the general election of 1983, Labour was committed to withdrawing Britain from the Common Market and only accepted membership in 1987. Both parties, in government, have been "awkward partners" in BRITAIN AND THE NEW EUROPEAN ORDER 103 Europe.1 In substance, there has been great continuity between...

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